Extracts from a letter from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) on the first General Assembly of the United Nations
(Ref.: 207/44)

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I do not at all share the view that, in the present situation, it would have been an unqualified disaster if the organization had broken up at the first meeting of the Assembly. A more realistic organization in the political sphere would probably sooner or later have taken its place, and world opinion would have received a healthy jolt. The League of Nations, with its unanimity clause, which, inter alia, through its rendering completely inoperative the Article providing for the revision of Treaties, and with the unofficial amendments of its Covenant contained in the Resolutions adopted by the Assembly in October, 1921, was not found out by world opinion for 16 years, and, in the meantime, States which affected to believe in it neglected their defences. It would have been more in the interest of its members if the League had had its crisis in the early years, when any immediate danger of the recurrence of world war would have been unlikely. Then the futility of the organization would have been quickly apparent, as well as the unwillingness of the vast majority of the members to increase their commitments. The States might at least in that case, at a time when remembrance of war was still fresh, have fallen back on themselves for their own defence. As it was, collective security became collective insecurity, and UNO may develop similarly if future meetings of the Security Council continue on the lines of the first meeting, with every grievance round the world grist to the mill of a powerful State. I find it difficult to believe that any organization could survive many such meetings. It is not plain speaking that need be feared, if it is indulged in in the veritable interest of the States under discussion. It is the cynicism of the proceedings that is the danger. Plain speaking that is honest might as well be tried for a change, as it was seldom indulged in at Geneva. There, the 'esprit de Genève', with hand-shaking, polite phrases, and entertainment on a vast scale, in which friends and potential enemies participated, reigned for twenty years, and a world war ensued. It is not plain speaking itself that counts, or is a danger. No more than it is the 'esprit de Genève', nor friendliness between delegates, nor entertainment - all that has been tried. What counts is the policy pursued by any Great Power, if it becomes a menace to the interests of any other Great Power. That is where the supreme danger lies, and it is on that that attention ought to be focussed. And only the Great Powers, themselves can find solutions for their problems, with due respect to the rights of smaller States. The alternative to finding solutions is at any rate for all to see after the years 1939/45. The aggravations after another war, with new weapons, can hardly be imagined.

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In the present international situation, there are all the elements for trouble between the only States which can produce a world war, which is now more than ever the supreme danger. Soviet interests are clearly developing for a clash with British interests, in (to mention only a few regions) the Mediterranean, the near and middle East, and the Baltic; and with American interests in China and Manchuria, and with American oil interests in Iran, &c. After World War I, when the Japanese prepared to remain on the mainland, the British and Americans ordered them out, and they got out. That was a serious enough step for Japan's allies to take at that time, but it is a more dangerous situation when the United States has now to protest against Soviet action in Manchuria, and when frontier (air) incidents begin between Russia and the USA in that region. For Russia is in a very strong world position, with her prestige, her vast territory and resources, her inexorable dictatorship versus democratic procedures, her easy remobilization, her secrecy, and her supporters in many countries. I do not believe that Russia desires further war, no more than do the others, but it is dangerous for her to follow the precedents, as she almost admits she is doing, set by other Empires in their policies and practices when they were expanding Powers. And it is not helpful to cry fascist to all who do not agree with the Soviet Union. Of course Russian propaganda is useful for her own population, and State control is such that that population is not subject to the propaganda of the nations attacked. It was control of this kind which made the internal situation of Germany so strong until she crashed militarily.

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