Letter from John J. Hearne to Frederick H. Boland (Dublin)
'Re: The International Situation'
(Secret)

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 67 of the 14th July¹ in the matter of the present international situation.

On receipt of your telegram I arranged to see Mr. Pearson today. Mr. St. Laurent is campaigning in Quebec in the Provincial General Election.

Mr. Pearson received me at 2.30 p.m. He returned a few days ago from the defence talks in Washington. When our conversation turned at my instance to the international situation he appeared eager to give me a full account of the proceedings in Washington. The following paragraphs contain a summary of what the Under-Secretary of State said:-

At the commencement of the talks, which were attended by Messrs. Lovett,² Bohlen,³ Kennan,⁴ Hickerson etc. for the United States, Mr. Pearson asked what the extent of the danger was against which defence measures were to be taken; in other words, was war in the immediate future likely or otherwise.

The United States officials were, by contrast with the British, relatively optimistic about the immediate future, Lovett gave a masterly summary of the situation as he saw it. Mr. Pearson said that he was never more impressed by Lovett's great ability.

Lovett seemed quite sure that if the United States continued her present firm attitude to Russia on Berlin, Russia would back down. All the United States officials were quite confident on that point. They felt that the United States might have to back down to some extent also in order to solve the Berlin impasse.

There is no evidence at all to show that Russia is making preparations for war. And there is nothing coming from the Missions in Moscow indicating that Russia intends to make war in the immediate future.

Mr. Pearson added, however, (to me) his own view that the Russians don't need to make much further preparation for a war in Europe. Their armies dominate Europe and could march across the whole of that continent without any fear of being held. And, with regard to the despatches from the Missions he said that if war was intended now the Missions would not be likely to know.

The United States officials appeared to be satisfied that there is not at present in existence any Soviet plan or policy which Russia would be prepared to carry out at the risk of war. In that sense they distinguish the present situation from that preceding World War II. Germany was prepared to enforce issues to the point of conflict.

Short of an accident, the United States officials ruled out immediate war. The example of an accident was the following: suppose the job of feeding two million Germans in Berlin by the process of dropping 2,000 tons of food per day from the air could not be continued and a train was used and stopped by the Russians that accident might cause a clash resulting in war.

General Pope⁵ the Canadian member of the Military Mission in Berlin reports to Ottawa this week that the delivery of food by plane cannot go on successfully for more than four or five weeks longer (Mr. Pearson did not say why).

It was the general view at the Washington talks that an ultimate war with Russia is inevitable. The Russian and the American systems could not live side by side in the world.

The preparation for an ultimate war should begin now. An extension of the Brussels Pact was not practicable; the Pact was, by its very nature, not one that could be extended. A new Pact was necessary. It would be an Atlantic Community Pact of separate States for defence purposes within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter. There was nothing to prevent such a Pact and the Brussels Pact existing together.

Ireland was discussed in connection with the new Pact and the general view was that Ireland should be given an opportunity of becoming a Party should she so desire.

Spain and Australia were also mentioned. If Spain was included the ideological basis of the Community could be endangered. If Australia came in the Atlantic Community idea could not be maintained.

At the end Mr. Pearson said that the relative optimism of the U.S. officials was, in his view, due to the facts that war would not mean an invasion of the continental United States (Russian is short of long range bombers), that Russia has not the atom bomb (this they know), and that, in the long run, Russia must lose a war with United States.

The relative pessimism of the British was, he thought, due to Britain's vulnerability and to general depression. Mr. Bevin was making everybody's flesh creep.