Letter from Seán MacBride to Frank Pakenham (London)
(Confidential)

My dear Frank,
I am sending you herewith a copy of the paper¹ I read at Chatham House the other night, together with a copy of an Aide Mémoire which was delivered to the CRO following upon Basil Brooke's first visit to London and a copy of an Aide Mémoire² which was delivered to the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg in reply to an intimation from the United States Government that we were about to be invited to join in the Atlantic Pact. The latter two documents are, of course, confidential. These documents together form, more or less, a brief of the position.

The Aide Mémoire in relation to Brooke's visit, was sent as a result of an official announcement published from Downing Street following upon the discussions between the Prime Minister and Brooke; the clear implication from the official announcement was that legislation was contemplated which would make partition more permanent and definite than it already is. No reply has been received to either of the two Aide Mémoires enclosed.

In dealing with the British Government, I am always in the difficulty of never being quite certain of the grounds upon which they refuse to face up to the partition question. I feel that it cannot be on the merits.

If it is on the merits, I feel that our case is so strong as to be practically unanswerable. The right to national self-determination is the one upon which all other democratic rights are founded. As a national entity, there can be little dispute about Ireland; we have more clearly defined boundaries than any other country; we have a distinct national history and our people are the same colour and homogeneous. I can conceive of no other test to determine what constitutes a national entity for the purposes of the exercise of the right to national self-determination.

But even if, for some special reason - for which I can see no justification - it were to be determined that irrespective of boundaries and history a minority, no matter how small, were to be given the right to set up its own State there can be no justification for coercing the people of Counties Tyrone and Fermanagh, Derry City, Mid-Derry, South Down, Mourne and South Armagh. If, irrespective of boundaries and history, minorities are entitled to opt out of a state, why, then, are nationalist areas in the Six Counties precluded from exercising the same right?

The right to national self-determination is the most clearly defined of the democratic rights by all standards laid down and it should apply to Ireland. On the merits, I do not think that the British Government could ever take the stand that a political minority in an otherwise clearly defined national unit, had a right to set up an independent State. If this were to be applied in practice, none of the existing states could survive, for there are political, racial, religious and colour problems in most states. I feel, therefore, that the attitude of the British Government on partition cannot be governed by the merits of the question.

If the opposition of the British Government is not based on the merits, then it must be based on expediency. The consideration of expediency involved may be either of two: expediency from the point of view of British policy as a whole, or expediency from the point of view of internal politics in Britain.

From the point of view of Britain's policy as a whole, to consider it necessary or advisable to maintain partition and thus alienate the natural sympathy of the Irish people from Britain is surely a short-sighted policy. The continuance of partition merely serves as a barrier to the good relationship which must inevitably exist between Britain and Ireland if only permitted to develop. Over the centuries, every conceivable method of dealing with Ireland has been tried by Britain save the one obvious and natural one, namely, acquiring the friendship of Ireland on the basis of equality. Surely, in this era, Britain's constructive policy should be to acquire the Irish people's friendship and support. In time of war, the advantages of having Ireland as a willing friend and ally, far outweigh the possible advantages of having a strategical bridgehead of doubtful value surrounded by a hostile population.

Even in peacetime, the friendship of the Irish people would, I think, be of considerable advantage to Britain. Millions of Irish people are scattered throughout America and Australia. A great many of them occupy key positions in the political lives of the countries where they have settled. Irrespective of what Government is in power, here, so long as partition lasts they will have a sense of grievance towards Britain.

On the other hand, the lack of constructive policy on the part of the British Government may be due to the internal political difficulties that would result in the realm of British politics. I am inclined to think that this is probably a real difficulty and, in a way, I could understand it better than the other considerations which I have dealt with. If this is the real difficulty, I think that the Atlantic Pact provides a solution of it. The criticism that would be levelled at the Labour Government for taking any initiative in the matter of partition could be avoided in the context of the Atlantic Pact.

Our views have been sought by the U.S. Government on behalf of six other countries to indicate whether we would join. We have replied that we approve of the concept of Atlantic co-operation, but are unable to participate in a military alliance by reason of the fact that a portion of our country is occupied. Our reply, in common with that of other countries who have been similarly invited, will, presumably, have to be considered around a conference table. In that context, it would seem but natural that a discussion should take place of any obstacles that exist to prevent the development of fuller co-operation in the Atlantic area. If effect is to be given to the concept of Atlantic co-operation every effort should be made to resolve the differences that may exist among the Atlantic nations.

I know perfectly well, of course, that British diplomacy could easily stifle a discussion of the partition question, or any independent initiative that might be taken by any of the powers concerned in the Atlantic Pact. But it does appear to me to provide an opportunity, if the British Government is so minded, to have the matter examined on the initiative of one of the Atlantic nations, thus relieving the Labour Government of the onus of having to take the initiative in the matter. If this were to be done, the best country to do it would, I think, be Canada, as I think that initiative coming from Canada on this matter, would be better received by British public opinion and by our friends in the Six Counties than it would coming from elsewhere. Of course, I know perfectly well that Canada would not take such initiative unless she felt that she was not thereby embarrassing Britain. For these reasons I do feel that the Atlantic Pact provides a completely new background.

The whole position could be examined and at least an attempt might be made to find a solution. It would be the best situation in which to approach the question, from the point of view of British public opinion, of the Tories in the Six Counties and of our own public opinion in Ireland. This examination could be undertaken in this manner without running into political difficulties in Britain.

Once we get down to a discussion of the actual problem around the table, I do not think that the finding of a solution would be so very difficult. Our friends in the Six Counties do a good deal of blustering but I think that they realise that the ending of partition is inevitable; a section of them take the view that it might be more advisable from their own point of view to reach a compromise solution now than to await a time when they might have no alternative. From our point of view we would be prepared to meet any fears they may have, real or imaginary, in a reasonable way.

Sorry for inflicting such a long letter on you, but I often despair of the complete lack of understanding and interest that I find among members of the British Government on this very urgent problem. They are far more interested and know far more about Palestine, Indonesia, Vietnam or Burma than about Ireland. Mr. Attlee is, I think, interested and has himself a constructive approach; Philip Noel-Baker on the other hand, gives me the impression of living in the last century as regards Ireland. I was rather horrified when I met him the other day, that he should tell me, more or less out of a clear sky, that if there was any violence in the Six-Counties, he would not hesitate to utilise the British Army to protect the integrity of the Six-Counties. I told him, as gently as I could, that I thought that, instead of considering how best he could use the British Army in the Six Counties, he should consider the best means of avoiding any such situation. The other members of the British Government always give me the impression of being too busy to be bothered about this question.

I intend sending a copy of the paper I read at Chatham House to Mr. Attlee with a short personal note, as I feel that if he has time to apply his mind to this problem he would have a constructive approach to it.³

I also enclose herewith a copy of a personal letter I wrote to Jowitt some time ago - I think I already showed it to you - it deals with some of the arguments frequently used in Britain.⁴

Thanks ever so much for the dinner. It was nice to see you. When are Elizabeth⁵ and yourself coming over to Ireland again? If you can, let me know in advance.