No. 323 NAI DFA/5/305/14/36

Letter from Seán MacBride to John W. Dulanty (London)

Dublin, 15 May 1949

My dear John,
I have been so busy since I returned, that I had no opportunity of writing to you fully. The situation here, on my arrival, was in a state of complete ferment. The publication of the terms of the 'Ireland Bill' the day before had already had far-reaching effects. Few things, since the Treaty days have so profoundly upset public opinion. The result has been to unify all parties in their strong opposition to the new British measure. The most surprising thing about the situation is that the mildest people, and those completely building on the idea of better relationship with Britain are the ones who are the most vehement in their indignation - they talk in terms of the most extreme measures.

The nationalists in the Six Counties now feel that all hope of a constitutional or democratic solution is gone. The population in the areas where there is a definite nationalist majority (Tyrone, Fermanagh, Derry City, Mid-Derry, South Down, South Armagh and Mourne) hitherto cherished the hope that, sooner or later, they would at least be granted the right to opt out of 'Northern Ireland' and join the rest of Ireland. While no promise had been made to them, that ray of hope was there. The inclusions of the conditions 'or any part thereof' in Clause 1 (b) of the 'Ireland Bill' has destroyed their last hope that democratic rights would be accorded to them. Now, even the most moderate are talking in terms of violence.

It does seem too bad that it should be within the power of a Government and Parliament who know little or nothing of the situation in Ireland, to cause such damage. Either through stupidity or ignorance, the British Government have caused untold damage to the future prospects of Anglo-Irish relationship. It is, at this stage, hard to foretell the grave consequences that may ultimately result from the wave of antagonism they have created.

In the course of my conversation with Mr. Attlee, Ernie Bevin and Philip Noel-Baker before leaving London, I certainly did not exaggerate the reactions that I anticipated to find on my return. But, apparently, the lack of understanding or even of interest of Anglo-Irish relationship is the same now as always.

On review of the events that have occurred in recent months, a number of things have, in the light of recent events, made me doubt the good faith of the British Government in their dealings with us. I set these out hereunder, as I think that, if opportunity offers, you should mention these matters to the members of the British Government whom you meet:-

  1. In my interview with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Noel-Baker on Thursday, the 5th May, Mr. Bevin stated repeatedly and emphatically: 'I would never have agreed to the inclusion of the provisions about Partition were it not that we were told by our lawyers that they were absolutely essential.' I pointed out what should have been obvious to a layman, that Partition was already legally in existence on the British Statute Book and it was unprecedented to re-enact a law that was already valid. His reply was: 'Well our lawyers insisted that it was essential, otherwise I would never have agreed to it.'

    Philip Noel-Baker was present throughout and remained silent on this point.

    Philip Noel-Baker and I left together, met M. Schuman, the French Foreign Minister and the French Ambassador,1 who had been waiting outside, and then had a conversation on the landing which lasted about five minutes. I then asked Philip Noel-Baker what was the basis of the legal opinion which the British Government had obtained, stating that it was necessary to include provisions in Clause 1(b) of the 'Ireland Bill'. He then, to my amazement, said: 'Ernie was quite wrong. It was not because of any legal considerations that we decided to include these provisions. Our decision was prompted purely by political considerations.' I then asked him why he had not so informed Mr. Bevin a few minutes previously. He did not reply to this, but complained of speeches that had been made about Partition and seemed to suggest that it was because of these speeches that this Clause had been introduced in the Bill. I asked him whether it was his intention to introduce a new Bill every time someone made a speech about Partition.

    I noticed from your report of the other day that Ernie Bevin repeated to you substantially, the same thing in relation to the legal advice upon which they were acting.2

    It is quite obvious from the above that someone is not being truthful - or, to be more charitable, someone has been misinformed. Whichever it is, it is just too bad that decisions having such profound repercussions should be taken so casually.

  2. Mr. Attlee, in the House of Commons, said he was surprised at the indignation caused here, as no protest had been made when he first made his original statement at the end of last year. This statement is either deliberately misleading or made in complete ignorance of the facts.

    The first indication that any legislation embodying a constitutional guarantee to maintain partition [was planned] was contained in a communiqué issued from 10 Downing Street on the evening of the 6th January last. On the 7th January I addressed what could only be regarded as a very strong and grave warning, in an Aide-Mémoire, which you delivered to the British Government, a copy of which you no doubt have.3 In addition, you called repeatedly in relation to this matter, and in relation to the 'Ireland Bill', on Mr. Noel-Baker and the C.R.O.

    Again, here, there appears to be an attempt to mislead or an unpardonable ignorance of the facts.

  3. Following upon conferences held in Chequers and Paris in relation to the repeal of the External Relations Act, it was the clear understanding that both Governments would consult concerning any consequential legislation. It was even agreed that there would be consultations as to whatever statements would be made in either Parliaments. This was insisted upon by Australia, New Zealand and Canada. They injuncted the British Ministers and ourselves to refrain from saying or doing anything that might cause misunderstanding or friction. We all accepted this position. The Commonwealth Ministers had, to a certain extent, sided with us in the course of these discussions and expressed annoyance at some press reports which emanated from the C.R.O. of a hostile nature to Ireland.

    We carried out our side of the understanding and consulted the British Government about statements which were made in the Dáil by Mr. Costello, when the Republic of Ireland Bill was introduced; our Officials went over in January to discuss various legal points that might arise,4 and you yourself frequently sought information concerning the proposed 'Ireland Bill'.5

    Despite the understanding that existed, and the repeated inquiries made, we were not consulted, nor informed that the provisions objected to were being included. The first notification received was twenty-four hours before the Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. This sudden and practically surreptitious method of dealing with this matter was certainly not in accordance with my understanding of the basis on which the Governments were to co-operate in maintaining good relationship.

  4. The purport of our reply to the invitation to join the Atlantic Pact, which you delivered to the British Government on the 8th February,6 was that we agreed with it, but that Partition made it impossible for us to participate. In the final paragraphs we suggested that an opportunity might be given to seek a solution. On the 9th March I wrote a fairly full letter to Ernie Bevin,7setting out what I considered to be a constructive line of approach to our position in relation to the Atlantic Pact and Partition. He replied on the 19th March, not turning down the suggestions I had made, but stating that he had not been able to give it the thought that it required and suggesting that he would see me on his return from America.

    True, this was an informal exchange of views, but it was, nevertheless, a friendly one, seeking a solution for a difficult problem. The position was that I had made an informal proposal, which he wanted more time to consider and ultimately to discuss with me. There was no further discussion, and instead, this unilateral bombshell exploded, thus bedevilling the possibility of a constructive solution.

    This, too, leaves me wondering whether there is any genuine desire to establish good relationship and to find a solution.

If you are informally able to obtain explanations of these matters, I should be very glad to have them. Until I do, I shall naturally find it very hard to believe in the good faith of the British Government; this, of course, renders our dealings much more difficult.

With very best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) S. MacB.
Minister for External Affairs

1 Réné Massigli (1888-1988), French diplomat; Ambassador to London (1944-54).

2 See No. 319.

3 See No. 228.

4 See No. 226.

5 See Nos 230, 234, 267, 317, 318, 319, 320 and 321.

6 See No. 261.

7 See No. 291.


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