Memorandum for Government by the Department of Defence
'Procurement of arms and equipment for the Defence Forces'
(S/485) (Secret) (Copy No. 8)

‘should have an immediate investigation made as to what supplies of suitable Arms and Equipment are procurable from countries other than Britain and should submit a report to the Government on the results of the investigation’

and to inform the Government that the American Ambassador has intimated to the Minister for External Affairs that

‘The Embassy re-affirms the willingness of the United States Government to consider Irish Arms requirements as circumstances and other United States defense commitments permit upon receipt of a communication from the Irish Government addressed to this question’.

1. ‘ that the State will endeavour to remain neutral in future wars;
2. that the defence forces will be organised, trained and equipped on the basis of operating on and in defence of our own territory;
3. that in the event of Great Britain being involved in another major war, our forces would be sufficiently strong to enable the Government to assume complete responsibility for the defence of this country so that Great Britain could not justify a claim that it was necessary to occupy our territory, or part thereof, to protect both this country and Great Britain from invasion by another Great Power;
4. that the defence forces to be raised, equipped and maintained should be sufficiently strong to ensure that, on the one hand, Great Britain’s enemies would be deterred from attempting to invade this country for the purpose of defeating Great Britain and, on the other, that Great Britain and her Allies, would be deterred from attempting to invade this country for the purpose of securing bases from which to attack their opponents.’

The Minister for Defence desires to emphasise that the implementation of the foregoing policy necessitates the provision of strong forces adequately armed and equipped, and which could be raised to meet a war situation which might develop quickly.

The Minister for Defence desires to emphasise that this estimate is based on the assumption that the Army will operate on orthodox military lines and must be prepared to oppose first class forces fully equipped with modern armament. To achieve this purpose, all units would have to be fully equipped with and trained in the use of the type of armament they would use in war. This would involve the complete equipment, with the most effective modern equipment procurable, of two divisions, local reserves and garrisons which is the minimum force with which it could be hoped to garrison the country and deter invasion or, alternatively, offer effective resistance for any appreciable time against the type of opposition with which the Army would be faced.

The Minister for Defence desires further to emphasise that the estimate of requirements contained in the schedule represents the essential equipment which should be available in this country to enable the Army to mobilise and expand quickly to meet a war situation which developed with little warning.

While further expansion might, in certain circumstances, be considered both necessary and desirable, this estimate has been restricted to the equipment required for minimum forces which it is suggested should be raised on mobilisation.

The position is, therefore, that unless there is an early and reasonable prospect of procuring from some source, at least the bulk of the equipment listed in the attached schedule, an effective air defence cannot be organised and consideration will have to be given to recasting defence plans, organisation and training which has hitherto been based on the assumption that the weapons appropriate to that organisation and training would be available.

It must be anticipated that if orders are placed now for equipment delivery will not be made for periods varying from one to three years. If major equipment is not procurable, it should be realised that territory would have to be abandoned at an early stage and resort be had to guerrilla warfare which would then be the only kind of resistance possible under modern conditions against an enemy vastly superior in armament and possibly numbers. An important factor in this regard is the effect on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries (particularly Great Britain and the United States of America) of any change of policy by this country in relation to tactical doctrine. If the present scheme of defence and the idea of holding the territory and fighting as an organised army is abandoned and instead defence policy were to be based on the abandonment of territory, ports and air ports to an invader and a resort to guerrilla tactics, such a decision would have serious repercussions on this country’s relationships with the countries concerned. On purely military grounds they would feel that their own security was endangered by an undefended area on their flank.

If another world war occurs, with Russia as the principal enemy of the West, air power is bound to be used extensively and the threat of air borne landings will be much greater than in the last war. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries will regard this country as a vulnerable area for such landings. If there is not an organised army trained and equipped to meet an invasion of this kind in this country, those countries will feel that not only have they a right to come in and take over its defence on the plea that they are defending this country from an invader and are also defending the West, but also that they are forced to do so for their own security. They are not likely to wait until actual invasion occurs, but would take such action once it was evident that this State had not organised forces capable of defending its territory.

1. Air Defence
2. Ground Forces.

At the present time there are no adequate means available of giving either the Army or the civil population adequate warning of the approach of hostile aircraft. With the advent of jet propelled aircraft and the consequent increase in speed complete reliance on sound or visual detection of the approach of aircraft is out of date. Even if observed approaching the coast, hostile aircraft could have completed their mission and cleared off before warning could be given in the target area. With early warning radar equipment of the type suggested in the schedule, it would be possible to alert the Civil Defence Organisation and citizens would, at least, have a chance of reaching some sort of shelter before an aerial attack commenced. From the military view point radar equipment is of comparatively little value without the support of anti-aircraft guns in quantity. The provision made in the schedule for anti-aircraft artillery represents the minimum necessary to protect the principal cities, ports, air fields and important installations such as generating stations. Any reduction in the proposed provision will mean a decrease in the number of vulnerable points which could be protected. Fighter aircraft are also an essential part of air defence. Due to the absence of hard surfaced runways provision for fighter aircraft has not been included in the schedule of requirements. As delivery of such aircraft will probably take about the same time as is required to build the runways, it is apparent that orders should be placed for jet propelled aircraft as soon as the work on the construction of the runways is commenced. As the plans for the projected hard surfaced runways at Baldonnell are only in their initial stages the making of firm recommendations regarding the provision of fighter aircraft is being deferred for the present.

As these enquiries may not result in any supplies becoming available, within a reasonable time, the Minister for Defence proposes to continue the enquiries and investigations at present being made to obtain supplies of suitable equipment on the continent and elsewhere. The normal procedure of obtaining the prior sanction of the Minister for Finance for any purchases proposed will, of course, be followed.