Letter from John A. Belton to Seán Nunan (Dublin)¹
(Secret)

Last night, I attended a small private dinner party given by Dr. Conant,² the American High Commissioner. Apart from the fact that we live next door to each other, he has always been extremely friendly to me. After dinner, he took me apart from the other guests and had a very long conversation with me, the principal points of which are as follows:-

1) The death of Herr Reuter,³ the Mayor of Berlin, was a grievous blow as there was no one whom he could think of who had anything like the courage, integrity and personality of the deceased. Berlin was, even under Reuter, in a very unstable and uncertain position and it was hard to see how that position would not now seriously deteriorate. The American Government attached the greatest possible importance to the maintenance of the status quo in West Berlin and it seemed to him that now a heavier burden would be thrown on American shoulders. He envisaged the possibility of the Russians seizing the occasion to start a new blockade, which would, of course, involve the reestablishment of the air lift. In general, he felt very depressed and pessimistic about the future of West Berlin.

2) He said that the question of the ratification of the German Treaty and of the entry of West Germany into EDC was now more than urgent. It was rapidly approaching a climax. The United States Government was using every possible form of pressure and persuasion to induce the countries concerned to expedite ratification. France, obviously was the great difficulty due 1) to its innate and traditional fear of Germany and 2) to the uncertainty as to how long the Laniel⁴ Government would last. The recent statement by M. Guy Mollet was a ray of light in an otherwise dark situation. He believed that France would nevertheless yield to American pressure within a reasonable time. He stressed very solemnly that time was very much of the essence and went so far as to say that, if the matter was not settled, in principle at least, before the 1st February next, he could only regard the future of Western Europe as a very gloomy prospect. I pressed him as why he should fix a period of four months as a deadline and his reply was that there was a growing restlessness in the USA, in France and in Italy about the whole situation. He emphasised particularly that the American people were beginning to look for some material dividends for their colossal capital expenditure in Western Europe. There was a limit to their patience and to their pocket. He himself was using every possible endeavour and was urging the State Department to increase their pressure to bring about a speedy ratification.

3) One of the obstacles, as far as France was concerned was the Saar.⁵ He was glad that this question had been more or less soft-pedalled in Strasbourg, but thought it would have been much preferable not to mention it at all there but to leave the whole question open and free for discussion at the proposed meeting in Paris between Adenauer and Bidault.⁶ He believed that Adenauer would agree to some kind of formula for the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Saar, with the arrière-pensée that he could return to the charge at some later and more favourable occasion. Undoubtedly such an agreement would be very unpopular in West Germany and Adenauer would be accused of selling the pass. He can, however, overcome this with his present parliamentary majority and with his extremely strong personal standing. Adenauer, however much he would like to have the Saar back, is not prepared to allow this question to delay Germany’s entry into EDC. He is most anxious to have this effected as soon as possible, particularly as it will, from the said entry, take at least two years to recruit, equip and train the twelve divisions which Germany is to supply. One of the most likely reasons for Adenauer’s silence as to the composition of the new Cabinet is that he wants to be sure of Ministers who will support him in this idea.

4) President Eisenhower, the State Department and the American Government generally regarded Adenauer’s policy with the greatest of sympathy and would render every possible assistance even to the point of gratis supply of armaments and military equipment. France, as a defender of Western democracy, had sunk to a very low level in the eyes of the American Government who were more and more inclined to rely on Germany and to a certain extent Spain. Italy was, as a result of De Gasperi’s⁷ defeat in the last elections, regarded as a doubtful element in itself and as a potential source of conflict on the Trieste question.⁸

Dr. Conant’s reputation and prestige in this country stand very high indeed and, in my opinion, his views are worthy of careful consideration. He is generally regarded as one of President Eisenhower’s leading advisers.