Reflections by Gerard Sweetman on memoranda by John A. Costello
on his March 1956 trip to the United States¹

Some reflections on the visit of the Taoiseach to America and the two Memoranda submitted by him:²

There is no doubt that the visit has had an immense effect in publicising Ireland in America – an effect which could not have been bought by propaganda at all – even by the expenditure of vast sums quite beyond our national means. It has served to make the Irish in America more conscious of their mother ancestry, and that must bring results – in the Tourist trade will I hope be one example.

At the same time I doubt if the belief in our future influence is as great as the Taoiseach believes. I think much of the official part of the reception was due to the fact that this is election year. See paragraph 4

‘Indeed … Party’³

My view on this does not in any way detract from the value of the visit. It was Ireland’s luck that such an American necessity arose. Apart also from the advertisement value to Ireland, the Government have gained great prestige from the reception accorded to the Taoiseach. The Irish in America were too prone to regard de Valera as the only Irish leader. This is now changed, and internally we must benefit from that change in American influence on Irish affairs.

The main theme in the memorandum is that we must have a foreign policy. With that I could not agree more, not merely in reference to the Government but also in reference to Fine Gael. We have had no real foreign policy since 1948. Before that we had a policy – a clear enough one, though one which was deliberately misunderstood on two sides – Fianna Fail alleging we were un-Irish and pro-British, and certain Unionist elements trying to make us more British than the British themselves.

The vagueness that there has been in the public mind about our foreign policy since 1948 is understandable enough because there has been the same vagueness in our own minds. The public were not sufficiently prepared for the announcement of the Repeal of the External Relations Act; there was no prior build up. The public were confused by the speeches made when the British passed the Ireland Bill. It was of course quite inevitable that the British would take some such retaliatory action. My surprise has always been not that they did so, but that they did so little and co-operated so much.

Be that as it may, the events leading up to the enactments of the Republic of Ireland Bill, and those that occurred subsequently left a sort of vacuum in the public mind about our foreign policy that has never been filled because we have never crystallised our own views – much less got them across in public. The establishment of the Republic of Ireland was, without question, of inestimable value in its effect on domestic and internal policy, notwithstanding the re-emergence of the IRA, but without a clear and positive external policy it appears to lack logical effect. The action of India accentuated this apparent void.

Our entry into UNO gives us an opportunity of grappling with this problem. Indeed it does more; it demands that we have a foreign policy. In that I am in 100% agreement with the Taoiseach. I will go further and say I feel this policy must be adumbrated this year, either on the Vote for International Co-operation or on his own Vote – probably on the former as it will come first and we must retain the initiative.

He has set out his conception of our general policy line and what would flow from it in paragraphs 14 and 15. Subject to slight comment I wholeheartedly agree. I believe the distrust which Great Britain occasionally shows for the UNO arises first from her paramount necessity of avoiding anything that might appear to be of greater importance to her than the Commonwealth, and secondly from her knowledge that many of her territorial positions in the world are entirely illogical and yet in the face of the threat of Communism are absolutely necessary not merely to her survival but also to that of the free world. Cyprus seems to me such a case in point. France is, I feel, so riddled by a clash of ideologies that it is unable to think, much less to speak, clearly. I think it would be a great mistake to over-emphasise the role we can play in UNO. Over-emphasis will be greeted by other nations as it would be in the case of an individual and would be classified as ‘swelled head’.

I do not believe we can play such an important role as that which seems to emerge from the Taoiseach’s memorandum, but I do feel we can play a dignified role which will add to the nation’s prestige, though I do not feel this prestige will do anything to add to American investment in Ireland. On the other hand, however, I agree wholeheartedly that damage to our prestige in UNO must minimise our chances of obtaining American investment.

I feel it would be a mistake to stress too much the independence of our role. I agree therefore wholeheartedly with his view that we must consolidate and increase our friendship with the United States, even far above that, with Canada, and also with Great Britain in so far as we can without accepting Partition. I do not, however, agree that we have much in common with India, and I do not think any good – only the reverse – would come were we to side with India against any of the other three. I feel the lip service India occasionally pays to us is only for the purpose of having a dig at Britain. I do not think we know sufficient of the background to present policies in Africa on which to form a solid judgment. Certainly I do not.

Sweden in the midst of the Scandinavian bloc is in a geographical position we are not. The other members of the bloc are more equal in size and wealth. Our only geographical bloc would be with Britain on one side and Canada and the United States on the other, and we must be realistic in our practical measures accordingly.

We cannot possibly hope to afford the widespread diplomatic and consular representation that we might wish. If we dissipate such representation as we can afford we will get no value for it; rather we should decide what we can afford and concentrate that expenditure in those countries with whom we desire to be on the more friendly terms.

I do not accept Mr. Hammarskjöld’s advice as being impartial. Naturally he is concerned with the prestige of UNO and separate representation, even of every small country, increases its prestige. On the contrary I feel the very essentiality of our friendship with Canada might make the dual role of our Ambassador to Canada and to UNO more desirable. It certainly seems to me a consideration which should not be lightly thrown aside. I personally would wish our vote at UNO to be influenced by the view of Canada without of course feeling it essential always to follow her lead.

I do not know what financial implications are covered by paragraph 23, and cannot comment until I am so aware. In any event my view would be governed by the over-riding principle I have mentioned already. Our people cannot be educated in foreign affairs until our leaders are themselves clear on the foreign policy to be pursued. When they are, and express their views, public awareness will follow – it cannot precede. The relationship of the Department of External Affairs with the Press is bound up with policy about, the Irish News Agency. I am afraid I do not see much useful result from the suggestions in paragraph 24 but rather a further dissipation of our already meagre resources.

I do not understand what is meant by the reference in paragraph 27 to bringing strong men home. It seems to me implicit in the views expressed that strong men are also required abroad. How are they to be obtained? My view that the DEA is badly served, is well known, but the remedy must be faced.

Paragraph 29 leads me to say that having decided a foreign policy the next vital step is to formulate a military policy.

As regards the specific recommendations in paragraph 30 may I comment:

1. Yes, subject to our not appearing to get ‘swelled head’.
2. Yes.
3. I am not satisfied as to the necessity of this. It is a step once taken that can never be retracted and should not be taken at this stage. A return of the representation of each country should be obtained.
4. That is a sine qua non in any event.
5. I do not agree. Policy is the first essential but of course I will examine and consider carefully any proposals submitted by the MEA.
6. I wish to know the cost involved – before I agree.
7. 1. This is a matter on which we are always available for consultation, but again the overriding principle I have stated must be para mount in my view.
   2. Of course, if that is the accepted thing to do. The DEA might obtain a list of gifts presented by other members.
8. Agreed.
9. Yes, but reserving my right to disagree when the recommendations come before the Government.
10. Yes.
11. No. This would be ‘pour rire’.

Apart from these particular considerations, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to start on a campaign of achieving economies in Civil Service administration if an expansionist policy of our diplomatic representation is now initiated. The over-riding limit of representation expenditure must first, therefore, be determined.

Rereading this two things occur to me:

1. I have not made it sufficiently clear in the fourth paragraph of page 2 that I consider our friendship with Canada paramount above everything else.
2. Even if the Government decided against my advice to make the representation at UNO a separate appointment at once, we should not do so until we have the man in our mind for the job.