No. 442 NAI DFA/5/305/311/Pt 1
Letter from Conor Cruise O'Brien to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
'France and the Suez Problem'
(111/16:506/56) (Confidential)
Paris, 28 August 19561
- I had the opportunity of a talk yesterday with Mr. de Crouy-Chanel2 who is as you know Deputy Chief of the Political Affairs Section in the Quai d’Orsay. Mr. de Crouy-Chanel’s exposition of the French attitude to the Suez problem was in some ways fuller and in some ways more ‘nuancé’ than the public statements of French spokesmen and it may therefore be useful to give a summary of what he said.
- He began by briefly reviewing the London Conference which, he said, had been a decided success from the French point of view. There had been unanimity at the Conference on certain very important points – notably that Nasser’s action had been wrong and that the maintenance of freedom of traffic through the canal was an international interest. There had been unanimity on [a] much wider front amongst all the real users of the canal – amongst whom Mr. de Crouy-Chanel did not include the Soviet Union; the degree of support for the western thesis which had been forthcoming from such ‘oriental’ countries as Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia was particularly satisfactory. Mr. de Crouy-Chanel stressed the community of economic interest amongst the users of the canal, whatever ideological bloc they might belong to. He stressed also that from the western point of view, and specifically the point of view of France, the Suez question was one not of prestige or hypothetical contingent effects but of direct and vital economic interest. In view of the extent to which their trade passed through Suez, France’s essential interest was that freedom of traffic through the canal should be technically and juridically guaranteed; the guarantee of the Egyptian Government was not good enough.
- I asked Mr. de Crouy-Chanel whether the French Government were adamant on the formula ‘international management’ (gestion internationale) and whether they would in effect accept nothing less than this. He replied that provided the substance – that is to say really solid guarantees for freedom of traffic – could be obtained he thought the French Government would ‘not insist on any particular form of words’; International Management seemed to them at present the most clear cut formula but if any really serious counter-offer were forthcoming from Colonel Nasser, they would certainly consider it. Much would depend on the negotiating abilities of Mr. Menzies3 and his associates; he made it clear that in his view there was definitely room for negotiation. He thought it was quite clearly in Egypt’s interest not merely to get a settlement but to get the reality – under whatever form of words – of international management. Egypt was quite incapable, he said, of running the canal herself and if it were left in her sole charge the result would be not only that the users of the canal would suffer greatly but that she herself would be at a loss of the canal’s revenues – not to mention whatever sanctions the user countries might choose to apply against her. On the other hand, with an international commitment in the canal zone, very attractive perspectives should be opened to her – for example the Powers controlling the canal might be prepared to underwrite an Egyptian loan for the building of the Aswan Dam; investment banks in the USA would, he thought, readily provide the money under such an international guarantee while they certainly would not do so on Colonel Nasser’s guarantee alone. Mr. de Crouy-Chanel was not prepared to discuss this ambitious and far-reaching scheme further. I gathered that it was an idea for which the French are trying to enlist American support in order that Colonel Nasser may have the necessary quid pro quo for the internationalisation of the canal.
- I asked Mr. de Crouy-Chanel what the French reaction would be if Colonel Nasser came back with a proposal for a new conference of 48 or other larger group. Mr. de Crouy-Chanel said that France would not be opposed to a new conference and would have an open mind as to its composition, but always provided that the purpose of that conference would be to approve – or only modify in detail – a settlement of which the main lines would have been worked out already between the Egyptian Government and the users of the canal. If Colonel Nasser was not prepared to make any serious concession to the point of view of the users of the canal, the situation would become very grave; it might be necessary for the users of the canal to boycott it for the time being, sending all the traffic round by the more costly route of the Cape and bringing to bear technical and economic pressure.
- I observed that he had not referred to the use of military means. He replied that in the case envisaged – that is of a simple or camouflaged refusal by Colonel Nasser but assuming maintenance of order in Egypt – there would be no question of the use of force by France. France would use force only in the last resort, if necessary to protect French lives and property in the area against official or mob violence.
- I enquired whether there was any force, in his view, in the considerable volume of journalistic and other comment which asserted that the Suez problem and the North African problem were intimately associated. He said this was a King Charles’ head4 with some people; there were people who could think at the moment of nothing else but North Africa. The French Government thinks best to look at the Suez problem strictly in itself as a contention concerning an international artery which was vital to Europe. All other questions were, as far as this area was concerned, secondary to that.
- In conclusion, as I left, I asked him whether on the whole he took an optimistic view of the situation. He said he would certainly do so if he could know that Egypt would take a rational view of her own interest. In the case of that area of the world, however, one could have no such assurance. As he spoke, he looked not merely extremely tired – he looked as if he had had no sleep for several nights – but also exceedingly anxious about the outcome.
- Except on two points, I felt that Mr. de Crouy-Chanel’s exposé was an objective and reliable one. The first point was the suggestion of the Aswan Dam guarantee which may or may not be an eventual possibility but which might also be simply an imaginative suggestion made without very serious thought. The second point is the statement that the Suez problem must be treated as absolutely separate from that of Algeria. This separation is no doubt possible in the logical minds of the experts of the Quai d’Orsay, but it is quite certain that public opinion here links the two issues and that many influential supporters of pacification in Algeria desire the greatest possible humiliation, and preferably the fall, of Colonel Nasser as the man whom they believe to be responsible – by supplying arms and training and bellicose propaganda – for their troubles in North Africa. This feeling in papers like Figaro – more extremely in L’Aurore – cannot help but have a certain effect on the French Government’s attitudes. What Mr. de Crouy-Chanel did make clear, however, was that officials of the Quai d’Orsay wish to concentrate on the pacific solution of the Suez problem and to withstand the ‘revanchardes’ tendencies of this section of the Press and public opinion. Any solution in Egypt which will leave Nasser in control and which he can claim – however speciously – as a victory, is likely to cause an outcry on the right here, especially if it should provoke the resignation of the Governor General of Algeria, Mr. Robert Lacoste who, as you know, has more than once publicly called on the Government, in the interest of Algerian pacification, to take the firmest possible attitude against Colonel Nasser.
- If any conjecture can be made about the opinion of the majority of the French people, it would be that, much as they dislike what they know of Nasser, they would be relieved at a compromise settlement, even one which saved his face. Many thousands of families who now suffer bereavement and anxiety in the – to them unexpected – prolongation of the Algerian struggle, would certainly not welcome a new military adventure. It seems probable therefore, both in the light of Mr. de Crouy-Chanel’s exposé and of general conditions here that – despite a certain pressure from a section of the right wing Press – the tendency of French action will be less intransigent and bellicose than Mr. Pineau’s public statement at an earlier stage of the crisis might have led one to suppose. Much however obviously depends not only on Colonel Nasser’s ability but on how far he can control his people. It is clear that in spite of the real desire for peace which exists here, mob violence in Cairo or Alexandria would bring about very prompt retaliation.
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