Extract from a letter from Frank Biggar to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
'The Suez Crisis'
(Secret)

Although there is little serious expectation here that Col. Nasser will be prepared to accept the majority proposals of the London Conference as the basis for further negotiation, nobody seems to be prepared to answer the question – What then? The British Government continues to profess an attitude of grim determination but the only comment that official circles will make regarding the course which will be followed in the probable event of Nasser’s refusal to entertain the Western proposals is that ‘a very serious situation will arise’. These are the words employed by the Foreign Secretary in his broadcast on Friday night. They had already been used to me by Mr. Rumbold, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office, when I saw him that afternoon.²

2. The belief that Britain would resort to military action, either alone or in company with France, has never been universally held here. The dangers of such a course have been all too manifest. It is true that certain sections of the Conservative Party – and, to a lesser extent, of the Labour Party – would undoubtedly favour strong arm methods and it is not to be excluded that the Foreign Office has hopes of bringing about the overthrow of Col. Nasser and thereby restoring Britain’s waning prestige in Arab countries. The rattling of sabres, which began to be heard immediately the Canal was nationalised and which was muted during the period of the Conference, is sounding once more. It has, for example, been announced that contingents of the Life Guards are en route to the Middle East and the 3rd Infantry Division has been transferred to Salisbury on what is quite obviously its first step to the Mediterranean. On the other hand there has been a progressive moderation of opinion in the Tory press and, while this was partly due to the necessity for restraint during the time when the Conference was sitting, it can hardly be doubted that the obvious lack of enthusiasm for military intervention on the part of the great majority of the countries participating in the Conference has had its effect. The Liberal and Labour press has all along been strongly opposed to any military action except under the authority of the United Nations. It is not, perhaps, without significance that, according to Mr. Rumbold, no special preparations have as yet been made to counteract the economic effects of the Suez Canal’s being closed.
3. An admittedly speculative but not implausible explanation of the situation has been put to me by a leading journalist. This is that Sir Anthony Eden, in a fit of pique on hearing the news of the nationalisation of the Canal, ordered immediate military preparations against Egypt; that these were dutifully put in hand although the Chiefs of Staff were well aware that, with the resources available, effective military action was out of the question at least for several months; that these preparations are being continued because they have proved so much to the liking of the Tory die-hards; but that Sir Anthony has long ago abandoned any intention of using force and will, at an appropriate moment, slide gracefully from his untenable position.
4. A cardinal element in the whole situation is, of course, America’s obvious reluctance to getting involved in military adventures during the Presidential Election campaign, Eisenhower being, in the minds of so many American voters, the Peace-maker, the man who ended the Korean war and brought ‘our boys’ home. The Anglo-American alliance is the ultimate guarantee of Britain’s survival and it seems inconceivable that any British Government, particularly a Conservative one, dare take the risk of a serious rupture with the US. In the last resort, the American view must surely prevail. If this is true, then it seems logical that economic action against Nasser is the furthest that Britain could go. Indeed, the blocking of Egypt’s sterling is a first step in this direction.
   [matter omitted]

12. Two final points. First, as I mentioned earlier the British say they have taken no special measures to deal with any oil shortage which may arise as a result of the present dispute. In the event of their finding it necessary to do so they would, however, Mr. Rumbold said, wish to consult with us about similar arrangements in Ireland.
13. Secondly, during the course of my conversation with Mr. Trevedi,³ he enquired whether Ireland was likely to take any initiative at the United Nations in regard to the Suez crisis. I said I thought it was extremely unlikely, particularly as we should be only making our debut at the next General Assembly. Mr. Trevedi remarked that he should like to see a mediating committee consisting of say Ireland, the Argentine and Indonesia on the grounds that they would all be disinterested parties. This was, of course, a personal view, but it may be of interest as another indication of the role that we may be asked to play in the United Nations as a Western country uncommitted to any Power bloc.