Confidential report from Con Cremin to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
'Franco-British action on Suez'
(Confidential)

I called by appointment this morning on Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations Office, for a general talk about the decision of the British and French Governments to occupy the Suez Canal.

2. Sir Gilbert said that Israel feeling herself seriously menaced from the Arabs had chosen a rather favourable conjuncture to ‘retaliate’ against the incessant incursions of the Egyptians, of which the last occurred on Sunday night the 28th October, as Russia finds herself busy elsewhere with events in Hungary and Poland and the American elections were only a week away. Israel had, however, been guilty of one unfortunate omission in that immediately she began to move her troops, she should have advised the Security Council that she was engaged on an action to counter the activities of the Egyptians.
3. The British were rather afraid at one stage that Israel might turn her attention to Jordan, a step which would have involved Britain against her, because of the bilateral treaty with Jordan but ‘providentially’ she concentrated her attention on Egypt. The principal immediate factor which led to the Israeli mobilisation on Sunday was, Sir Gilbert thought, the decision taken and announced last week by Egypt, Jordan and Syria to put their forces under a unified command – a decision which he described as extremely provocative and inopportune.
4. Sir Gilbert offered no particular explanation of the decision taken by France and Britain to occupy bases in the Canal Zone beyond referring generally to the statements by Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons and mentioning the disturbing effect for the whole area of Nasser’s policies.
5. On the repercussions of the Franco-British action, on the United Nations, Sir Gilbert said that the Charter has one serious lacuna inasmuch as it provides only for aggression across or threats to frontiers but omits all reference to a vital lifeline like the Suez Canal. Apart from this, however, experience has shown that the procedures of the Security Council are much too slow to deal with a situation which requires an immediate solution. These procedures can be useful in certain cases where rapid discussion and action are not necessary as, for instance, in Kashmir but are totally inadequate for the kind of situation which arose in this particular instance. It is recognised here that the action taken by Britain and France deals a severe blow at the United Nations but, in the circumstances, there was no alternative. Sir Gilbert went on to say that while Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General, is held in the highest esteem by Britain, his threat, as reported in the press, either to resign or to express his views has caused perturbation as the duties of the Secretary General are circumscribed and limit his freedom of action. He added that while Britain has hitherto been extremely loyal to the United Nations, some people are now saying that she should get out of the organisation. He does not think that there is any question at all at the moment of this although he would not like to speak for the French who threatened to do so last year.
6. The breach on this issue with the United States is extremely unfortunate, Sir Gilbert continued, but there is no alternative to the British and the French on this occasion acting on their own. Mr. Dulles has been extremely unsatisfactory to deal with and there was little hope of securing American agreement to immediate concerted action of the kind judged necessary by Britain and France. Many Americans indeed are not at all unhappy at the prospect of Colonel Nasser being brought to heel. This applies to individuals and also to the oil interests which have found him a very disturbing influence. A rather ironical aspect of the situation is that the Opposition who have regularly accused the Government of being too closely attached to the Americans’ coat-tails are now advancing as a major grievance the fact that on this occasion, action has been taken independently of the Americans. As for the reaction of the Commonwealth countries, Sir Gilbert said that the Australian press is divided (the Labour people taking the same line as their opposite numbers here) but the Government, while regretting the breach with the USA, fully support the action taken by London and Paris; in New Zealand the press is generally favourable but the Prime Minister, apart from his also regretting the breach with the USA, has not so far gone further; in South Africa where ‘the Government have a reasonable appreciation of our position’, the English speaking press is favourable and the Afrikaans press likewise, although with a distinct note of gloom as to the possible consequences; in India both the press and the Government are frankly hostile but Mr. Nehru has been relatively temperate in conversations with the British High Commissioner, although his message to the British Prime Minister was rather stiff. In Pakistan the press is likewise uniformly hostile but the Government, which ‘can’t stand Nasser’, have their views which, however, they cannot express for reasons of Moslem solidarity; in Canada both the Government and the press are perturbed, the former because of their remoteness from the scene and their attachment to the United States and to UNO, the latter because it is to a large extent under the influence of the American syndicated press.
7. Sir Gilbert threw no light on the question as to whether France or Britain had the major responsibility for the decision beyond saying that he felt sure that the French Government were happy to find that the British views coincided with theirs.
8. It is not possible at this stage to forecast the probable duration of the Franco-British military operation. Sir Gilbert said that, in the British view, it is to be of a strictly military character confined to military and strategical targets and that the occupation of the Canal Zone is to be of the shortest possible duration. He added that Egyptian allegations of the bombarding of Alexandria, Cairo and such centres are entirely incorrect. He thinks that there are very good prospects of the conflict being localised especially if its duration is short as the Russians are too busy with events in Eastern Europe to devote much immediate attention to the area. Sir Gilbert remarked that if the result of the operation should be to dislodge Colonel Nasser, the outlook for relations with the Arab world might be relatively bright.
9. As for the possible economic consequences of the operation, Sir Gilbert said that this matter has not been gone into in detail but that there might be awkward repercussions on the oil situation, at least until such time as the necessary re-adaptation has been made for tanker transport around the Cape unless, of course, the Canal were to become open again to shipping rapidly. There are, of course, risks of damage to the Canal in the course of the present operations but there were also risks of damage of this kind if the Franco-British action had not been taken and the Canal had come into the area of fighting between Israel and Egypt.