No. 458 NAI DFA/5/305/173/Pt II
London, 1 November 19561
The shocked incredulity with which so large a section of public opinion here greeted the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt on Tuesday has now, as the implications of the decision become clearer, turned to anger. Yesterday’s debate in the House of Commons well reflected the deeply divided mood of the country. The Prime Minister’s blustering defence of his Government’s policy before a crowded House, which included Sir Winston Churchill, was received with determined cheers by the Conservatives but even the most hardened Tory backbenchers were reduced to gloomy silence by the merciless indictment of the Government’s action which followed from Mr. Gaitskell in a bitter and powerful speech which concluded with the declaration that the Opposition would oppose the Egyptian war with every constitutional means at its disposal. There is no doubt that, in taking this line the Leader of the Opposition faithfully mirrored the attitude not merely of his own party, who received his words with prolonged cheering, but also of at least half the press and probably of a similar proportion of the country as a whole.
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The chief cause of all these doubts and apprehensions is, of course, the virtual unanimous condemnation with which the rest of the world has greeted the Anglo-French action. In addition there is the painful knowledge that the British and French are acting without any shred of legality and in direct contravention of the United Nations Charter as well as in complete contradiction of their frequent affirmations of their attachment to collective security and the rule of law. To Commonwealth disapproval and American anger is added dismay at the thought that Britain is now behaving in precisely the way for which she has so often condemned the Russians and at exactly the moment best calculated to relieve the Soviet Union of her embarrassment over events in Hungary. Finally there is the gravest of fears that the material and economic consequences of the invasion of Egypt will far outweigh the objective contemplated. Even if there is not a general war in the Middle East, one immediate consequence of military action will certainly be to close the Suez Canal although the maintenance of free passage through the Canal is the declared aim of the British action. A further question is whether oil supplies from the Middle East will not be cut off. In any event some shortage is bound to arise owing to the longer haul around the Cape and it remains to be seen whether the US in its present mood will be willing to replace Middle East oil by supplies from American sources. Even if it does it seems unlikely that dollar assistance for the purchase of such supplies, as was promised in the early days of the Suez crisis, will now be forthcoming.
The Anglo-French seizure on the pretext of the Israeli invasion of Egypt and the omission, which was clearly deliberate, to consult either the US or the Commonwealth before acting is of a piece with the general air of trickiness which has characterised Sir Anthony Eden’s handling of the Middle East crisis from the beginning. Only success can justify his latest action. If instead of a short successful campaign Britain finds itself with a long and costly guerrilla campaign on its hands in Egypt it seems impossible that the Prime Minister and probably the Conservative Government can survive.
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