Memorandum from Seán Murphy to Liam Cosgrave (Dublin)

The French Ambassador called on me this morning on the instructions of his Government to express their regret that the French-British action in Egypt appeared to be misunderstood in this country as well as in most other countries. He felt sure that the action taken would be justified in the not too distant future. France and Britain were satisfied that Nasser’s over-weening desire was to smash Israel. They were equally aware that Israel was prepared to resist any Egyptian aggression to the last man. With the knowledge that both Governments had of the Middle East, they were satisfied that the situation there could provoke such a bloody conflagration that nobody could possibly estimate the consequences for the peace of the world.

Before taking their action, the French and British were aware that it would be unpopular and that they would be under severe criticism. They did hope, however, that their motives would not be criticised in the unfriendly way that they have been. They were satisfied that the machinery of the UN was too slow to act in a situation which, in their judgment, needed immediate action – the action of preventing war on a large scale between Israel and Egypt. They were equally aware that Egypt had received, over the last twelve months, arms and equipment from Russia and the satellite countries which far surpassed Israeli armaments. It was for that reason that they decided to take the action which they did, namely, to reduce Egypt’s striking force and re-establish the position of armaments which existed at the end of last year.

I told the Ambassador that I would, of course, transmit what he had said to you but that I felt obliged to say that, without the special knowledge that he had alleged his and the British Government had of the situation in the Middle East, public opinion in most countries, including this one, could hardly be blamed for taking the view that stopping of war between two combatants was not usually done by reducing the armaments of one to the exclusion of the other. Added to which, public opinion was aware of the vested interests of both countries in the Suez Canal and also the very strong feeling of both countries against Colonel Nasser. I suggested that France and Britain would have been in a much stronger position to explain to the Security Council their special knowledge of the Middle Eastern position and their opinion that swift action was necessary in order to prevent a general war there and offer to take police action in the area pending the formation of a United Nations force for that purpose. Even if such a proposal would be more than likely vetoed by Russia and opposed by Yugoslavia, they would have nevertheless the moral support of the remaining members of the Security Council for whatever action they took.

The Ambassador replied that, as it transpired, such an attitude might have been the wisest one but, when situations needed swift action, Governments had to make up their own minds as to the best course to be pursued.