Extracts from a letter from Frederick H. Boland to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
(Confidential)

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At the conclusion of today’s debate in the General Assembly, there was a further meeting between the sponsors of the joint resolution to consider further tactics. The evidence of increased Afro-Asian support was noted with satisfaction. One or two members of the group suggested that, in an effort to win 100% Afro-Asian support for the joint resolution thereby isolating the Communist bloc completely, we should have another look at the proposed four-Power amendments. The general feeling, however, was strongly against this. It was decided not to make any further changes in the joint resolution and that the members of the group would either vote against the four-Power resolution or abstain on it. Sir Pierson Dixon suggested, at the end of the meeting, that, in an effort to win over the sponsors of the four-Power resolution and to meet the point of view of Austria, which had unexpectedly put in a resolution of her own during the day (document C attached),² we should add a paragraph to the joint resolution instructing the Secretary General to take any initiative which might seem possible to him with a view to securing a solution of the Hungarian problem in accordance with the Charter and the previous resolutions of the Assembly. The group decided to postpone a decision on this suggestion until a meeting to be held before the general debate tomorrow morning.

The future tactics of the United Nations in connection with the Hungarian problem will require careful consideration. There is a feeling, which is fairly widespread and which the Swedish Foreign Minister³ is stated to favour as a result of a conversation he had with Mr. Kuznetsov,⁴ the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Soviet Russia is anxious to get her troops out of Hungary as soon as possible. She recognises, it is said, that the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary militates against the possibility of pacifying the country and she is afraid that continued resistance in Hungary may provoke disturbances in her other satellites. Those who think there is something in this suggest that, anxious as Soviet Russia may be to withdraw her troops, it is difficult for her to do so under UN pressure, and that, from this point of view, the sooner the United Nations disinterests itself in the Hungarian problem and lets things quieten down a bit, the better the chances will be of Hungary getting back to normal and achieving the kind of internal régime which now exists in Poland.

This point of view is not entirely confined to people in close touch with the Communist delegations. I enclose herewith copy of a letter,⁵ with enclosure, which I received this morning from Mr. Kosinsky, the Hungarian émigré to whom I referred in earlier reports. You will see that he takes the view that, if the UN is not going to do anything serious about Hungary (by which he means if we are not prepared to face World War III), we would do better to abstain from ‘condemnations without sanctions’ because they may result in making the lot of the people in Hungary worse than it is at present. Coming from a Hungarian like Mr. Kosinsky, this point of view cannot be altogether ignored. Certainly, it would be very unfortunate, and a very adverse development from the point of view of the situation, if the Assembly’s action in connection with Hungary were to achieve nothing more than the expulsion of the foreign diplomatic missions and the foreign correspondents from Budapest.

These warnings which are now being heard in the corridors about the need for caution in the Assembly’s approach to the Hungarian problem received some reinforcement from the feeling which exists among a number of delegations that the debates on Hungary have gone on far too long, and that, if they are not terminated soon, the Assembly will be unable to adjourn its present session on the 15th February, as is generally hoped. This feeling of impatience is probably no more than superficial, however. The feeling of resentment at Russia’s treatment of Hungary is very strong in the Assembly as a whole and the feeling that the UN simply cannot afford to let the USSR ‘get away’ with it has made headway to the point at which even the Afro-Asian ‘neutralism’ which was so much in evidence during the earlier debates is now under obvious strain. The feeling which exists, however, that, once it has passed the joint resolution by a large majority, the Assembly should pause for a while and give Soviet Russia a chance of withdrawing her troops from Hungary without appearing to do so under UN pressure, may, however, militate against the acceptance by the group tomorrow morning of the British proposal that the Secretary General should continue to act to keep the issue alive.

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