No. 508 NAI DFA/5/305/210/Pt 1

Extracts from a letter from Frederick H. Boland to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
(Confidential)

New York, 10 December 19561

The Assembly met this morning and, after appointing the new High Commissioner for Refugees,2 proceeded at once with the debate on the situation in Hungary on the basis of the resolution of which I sent you the text this morning.3

As the US delegation had asked us to speak early on in the debate, we had put down our name yesterday and were fifth on the list of speakers. Our speech, of which I send you the text herewith,4 was brief but, I think, said all that the situation required. We gathered from the other sponsors of the motion, particularly the United States, that they were well satisfied with it.

As you will see, we took the precaution of stating in the speech the reasons why the joint resolution was not stronger in its practical effect. We did this because the Cuban delegate had obtained a good deal of newspaper publicity for himself by criticising the joint resolution on the ground of its weakness, much to the annoyance of the US and the other sponsoring delegations. We tried to make it clear in the speech that we were quite prepared to go as far as the Cubans, if it could be practically done.

[matter omitted]

The US delegation asked me to have a chat with them this afternoon about the introduction of a resolution depriving the Hungarian representative5 of his seat. They asked me how we stood on this question. I said that we would be in favour of expelling the present Hungarian representative from the Assembly on the ground that he is not representative of the Hungarian people at all but simply a Russian ‘stooge’; and I imagined it should be possible to frame a resolution with this purpose in such a way that it would not raise questions of recognition which might endanger the foreign missions in Budapest. Bonsal,6 of the US delegation, said that they agreed on this latter point. He was anxious to know, however, how we felt about the wisdom of introducing such a resolution even if there were no assurance that it would command a two-thirds majority. I said I was very dubious on this point. I was afraid that, if a resolution were introduced and not passed, the Soviet propaganda machine would represent the result as a signal defeat for the ‘forces of reaction’ and the morale of the people in Hungary would be dealt a heavy blow. While stating this as my personal view, I made it clear that, if such a resolution were introduced, our delegation would certainly vote for it in any case.

I asked the US delegation whether they had considered the possibility of getting the Hungarian representative’s credentials rejected in the Credentials Committee. What I had in mind was that the Credentials Committee would approve all the other credentials except those of the representative of Hungary and make a report to this effect to the Assembly. The Report would certainly be attacked by the Communist bloc but it would take a two-thirds majority to over-rule the report of the Credentials Committee and this the Communist bloc would certainly not get. The US delegation said they would consider this idea which had already occurred to themselves. The disadvantage they saw about it was that this procedure would not have the same moral effect as a resolution formally introduced and passed in the Assembly. Their purpose [is], therefore, to pursue their efforts to try to build up the necessary two-thirds majority for the resolution and I gathered that they were prepared to use considerable pressure to obtain it, if necessary.

We are so tied up with this Hungarian question at the moment that we find it difficult to get time to keep track of other things. We are playing a pretty active and common part in connection with Hungary, however, and, since it is by far the biggest question before the Assembly at the moment, it seems to me better to continue to concentrate our attention on it rather than to dissipate our efforts on matters of lesser importance.

I should, perhaps, mention that, when I referred to the Hungarian representative in the course of my speech today as ‘an imposter’, he got up from his chair and left the room. It is not certain, however, that this was a gesture of protest against my reference, although I understand that some people in the press gallery interpreted it as such. I should also say that the language which we employed in our speech was far and away more polite and milder than that used in most of the speeches in favour of the resolution which were made today.

1 Marked seen by Cosgrave on 15 December 1956.

2 August R. Lindt (1905-2000), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1956-60).

3 Not printed.

4 Not printed.

5 Imre Horvath (1901-58), Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs (1956-8).

6 Philip Bonsal (1903-85), a career diplomat who later served as United States ambassador to Bolivia (1957-9) and Cuba (1959-60).


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