No. 531 NAI DFA/5/305/281/A

Confidential report from William P. Fay to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
'for attention of Mr. BELTON'
(Confidential) (Urgent) (Copy)

Paris, 25 January 19571

  1. I recently asked for an interview with the Prime Minister to convey New Year greetings to him. It must be admitted that it is rare in modern French political history that one has been in a position to do this, since Cabinet crises occur so often that there would be little point in offering congratulations to a President of the Council who had taken office only a few weeks or months previously. Guy Mollet has however been in office just a year now and it seemed to me that the occasion called, not merely for a courtesy visit but, in view of the many matters of great importance which concern France at the moment, for an opportunity to hear from him personally the views of the French Government on these matters for the information, not only of our Government but of our Delegation in the United Nations. You will recollect from my telegram of the 22nd instant2 that I informed you of my intention and asked whether you wished that I should say anything to him on the subject of Algeria or any other point. I had the advantage of a conversation with Mr. Belton on the telephone this morning before my visit, from which I gathered that you were anxious, amongst other points, to know how the French Government proposed to deal with the question of elections in Algeria after the cease-fire had been proclaimed.
  2. As it turned out, the Prime Minister had intended to ask me to call next week. He has already invited a number of Ambassadors, mostly from European countries, to call to see him precisely on the subject of Algeria. He received me very cordially and said that he was glad to have the occasion of my visit to bring to the attention of the Irish Government the full extent of his recent declaration made on January 9th, of which the Press carried only relatively inadequate extracts. He handed me a number of copies of this declaration in an English version, of which I send you four herewith,3 together with four copies of the original in French. He said that he was entirely at my disposal to answer any question I wished to put to him on the subject.
  3. He began by saying that he hoped that the Irish Government, as the Government of a Christian State, would understand the grave issues which were involved for all Western Europe in what was going on in the Middle East at the moment. An appalling outbreak of religious fanaticism combined with racial hatred appeared to have gripped most of the Arab States. It was being used by the Communists to drive as wide a gulf as possible between them and the countries of Western Europe. Islamic fanaticism against Christianity was, he thought, being used by the Communists in an anti-religious sense as they had used it in the Islamic republics under their jurisdiction. I thought it strange that a Socialist Prime Minister should place such emphasis on the religious aspect of the matter having regard, in particular, to the anti-clerical attitude of most French Socialists in the past. I have no reason to doubt, however, the sincerity of Mr. Mollet’s remarks, though he may, indeed, have intended to stress this aspect to me having regard to the importance which, it is well-known, we attach to religion in Ireland. He himself, like his Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, and other leaders of the Socialist Party, have shown a considerable respect for the Christian and Catholic traditions of France, (as is shown, for instance, by Pineau’s call on the Holy Father last year) and have done all they could during their year of office to prevent the anti-clerical elements in the Party from raising issues, such as the schools question, which might divide French public opinion. They are, as you know, strongly supported, in all aspects of their present policy, by the MRP4 as well as by the Conservatives, both of whom represent broadly the Catholic vote in France.
  4. I asked Mr. Guy Mollet how he foresaw the development of the present tendencies in Algeria and in what conditions he thought it might be possible to hold the free elections which he had promised. He said that they were generally satisfied that if the vote in the United Nations were even relatively favourable to France, they would be able to deal with the outcome in a satisfactory manner. He admitted that his Government foresaw grave danger of redoubled violence both in Algeria and even in Metropolitan France during the next fortnight. The leaders of the revolt in Algeria were determined to bring about as much bloodshed and upset as they could prior to the debate in UNO. He even expected some spectacular attempts might be made – I gathered in the nature of terrorist outrages – even in France; but they had taken all necessary precautions to deal with this. Once the violent sector of the revolt learned that they had nothing more to hope from international intervention, he expected that matters would calm down. It was their intention, at that point, to hold elections as soon as possible in all areas in which relative calm prevailed.
  5. The elections would in the first instance be for communal and municipal authorities. Through these elections, he hoped that responsible elements might become available to enable wider elections to be held on a regional basis. Finally, they intended to have a general election for the whole of Algeria. They would discuss the future Algerian statute with the men elected to represent public opinion through these elections. In reply to my question as to the kind of political parties which would be able to participate in the elections, he said that there would be no restriction on such participation; all groups claiming to represent Algerian opinion would be able to present candidates, even the FLN or the MNA.5 He appeared to be quite determined to go ahead with this programme whether or not the European population in Algeria were fully agreeable. In his view, the Europeans would be glad to have the opportunity of escaping from the rule of the gun and the continuance of terrorist outbreaks. He did not think they would make many objections. It was the Government’s intention to invite representatives of States having a democratic background to come to Algeria to observe the general election. They would not admit observers from Communist States or, I gathered, from those of the Arab League which, in the French view, are not genuinely democratic States; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, are obvious examples.
  6. In the course of further conversation, Mr. Mollet told me that he had himself directed conversations to take place with the leaders of the FLN during the past year. Nine months ago, he had deputed the acting Secretary General of his own Party, Mr. Pierre Commin,6 to make contact with these men. His line with them was, he said, perfectly straightforward. He asked them to prove to him the fact that they had the genuine representative capacity they claimed to have. He issued them with a challenge; if on any particular day, even for a period of 24 hours, they could, by issuing the necessary orders, stop all acts of terrorism whatsoever throughout Algeria, he was prepared to accept that as some proof of their ability to speak for the revolutionary movement. They had been unable to do this. In fact, he knew the revolutionary movement itself was much divided. The so-called freedom fighters, the ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) who carried on the actual campaign in Algeria had nothing but contempt for the leaders living abroad, whom they regard as able to enjoy a life of luxury while their followers endure hardship for ‘the cause’. He did not regard the five so-called leaders who have been arrested, as the real leaders of the movement. Ben Bella and Khider7 were undoubtedly the most influential, but they had no wide authority. They were opposed by other movements, such as the MLA. Nevertheless, I gathered that if, as the result of the elections, preparations for which will be undertaken immediately after the vote in the United Nations, some of these leaders find themselves elected as the spokesmen of Algerian nationalists, Mr. Mollet would be quite prepared to deal with them.
  7. Mr. Mollet did not ask me for any statement as to the views of the Irish Government on the subject, though in the course of our conversation, I made it clear that we did not agree with the action in Suez. I undertook to bring to your attention immediately, the text of his declaration and expressed the hope that when the matter came to be discussed in the United Nations, Ireland would be able to take a constructive and positive attitude. He thanked me for this assurance and that concluded the interview.

1 Copy sent to Seán Murphy in New York.

2 Not printed.

3 Not printed.

4 Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP).

5 Mouvement National Algérien (MNA).

6 Pierre Commin (1907-58), French politician of the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), the French Socialist Party.

7 Mohamed Khider (1912-67), Algerian nationalist and politician, one of the founding members of the FLN.


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