Extract from a confidential report from Frederick H. Boland
to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
(Confidential)

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The general feeling here is that the United Nations has blundered somewhat in its handling of the Israeli-Egyptian situation and that, if it is not very careful, the only result of all its discussions on the matter during the past three months will be a renewal of sporadic fighting between Egypt and Israel. Realising, perhaps too late, that something must be done if this eventuality is to be avoided, the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly on Friday a document in which he made some cautious suggestions as to what might be done, after the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Strip, to prevent further clashes. You will see what these suggestions are from the document, which is attached.² The general impression with regard to them is that the Secretary-General – inevitably perhaps – is too much concerned with the legalisms of the matter and not sufficiently with its practical political aspects, and, unless something is done now to handle these latter more firmly and realistically, the Israeli-Egyptian situation will go from bad to worse. The major difficulty in the whole situation is that, for obvious reasons, France and Britain are in no position to play any leading part in the settlement of the Israeli-Egyptian problem and the United States is pursuing the curiously negative course of insisting that the problem is one for the United Nations acting through its Secretary-General. The Secretary-General, however, being determined, for his part, not to put himself out on a limb, will take no action that has not been specifically authorised by a resolution of the Assembly and, with the Assembly constituted as it is, it is virtually impossible to get any clear decisive majority in favour of a positive line of action. Australia, Canada and some other countries are working hard in the background to try and find a solution of the difficulty. One suggestion which was being canvassed last night was that Israel should withdraw from the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Strip and these areas should be reoccupied by Egyptian troops, accompanied, however, by either United Nations forces or United Nations observers. There will be great difficulty, I imagine, in getting the Israeli Government to agree to this, but, on the other hand, I hear that the United Nations Emergency Force is itself by no means a united body and that the Indian and Yugoslav components of the force have already intimated that they are not prepared to obey any orders which have not the specific endorsement and support of the Egyptian authorities. Efforts to find some way out of the difficulty are continuing over the weekend and the Assembly is to start its debate on the Secretary-General’s report on Monday morning. If we intervene in the debate, it will be to insist again, as we did on the 19th January, on the importance of making arrangements as regards the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Strip which will obviate the risk of further clashes or illegalities on one side or the other.

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