Minutes of the conference between representatives of the United Kingdom and Ireland
(Secret) (I.N. (38) 1^st Meeting) (Copy)

PRESENT
UNITED KINGDOM	ÉIRE
The Rt. Hon Neville Chamberlain, M.P., Prime Minister.	Mr. Eamon de Valera, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs.
The Rt. Hon. Sir John Simon, G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., O.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Commerce. Exchequer.	Mr. Sean F. Lemass, Minister for Industry and Commerce
The Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Bt., G.C.S.I., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department.	Mr. Sean MacEntee, Minister for Finance.
The Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, M.P., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.	Dr. James Ryan, Minister for Agriculture.
THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT
The Rt.Hon. Sir Thomas Inskip, C.B.E., K.C., M.P., Minister for Co-ordination of Defence. (For part of time)	Mr. J. W. Dulanty, C.B., C.B.E., High Commissioner for Éire.
The Rt. Hon. Oliver Stanley, M.C., M.P., President of the Board of Trade. (For part of time)
The Rt. Hon. W.S. Morrison, M.C., K.C., M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. (For part of time)

Secretaries

Sir R.B. Howorth, K.C.M.G., C.B. Mr. C. N. Ryan, D.S.O., M.C. Mr. W.D. Wilkinson, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he and his colleagues were very glad indeed to welcome Mr. De Valera and his colleagues to London. Since the Meetings held in 1932¹ it could truthfully be said that the relations between the two countries had not been impaired and that the conditions for reaching a better understanding were more favourable now than they had been. The forthcoming discussions would take place on a footing of complete equality and without any conditions. United Kingdom Ministers were very anxious to reach a satisfactory agreement on the various outstanding questions. There were a number of topics requiring examination and perhaps Mr. de Valera would be good enough to indicate his ideas as to the order in which these topics could most profitably be discussed.

MR. DE VALERA thanked Mr. Chamberlain for his welcome and said that he and his colleagues had come to London with the same intention of endeavouring to reach agreement on the outstanding issues between the two countries. As regards subjects for discussion Mr. Chamberlain would no doubt remember a Note² which he (Mr. de Valera) had addressed to him mentioning the questions of censorship and food supply and control in time of war. The Government of Éire had recently given careful consideration to the position of their country in the event of the outbreak of a major war. So long as the various important outstanding problems remained unsettled between the two countries there was a very real and serious danger that if Great Britain became involved in a major war the situation in Éire might not be very different from what the situation in the South of Ireland had been in 1914 when Mr. Redmond³ found himself faced with difficulties which proved beyond his control.

Of these major problems he would mention the question of Partition. In the view of the Government of Éire there should never have been any partition at all, and also there should be no coercion of the minority in Northern Ireland. It would be difficult to exaggerate the dangerous possibilities inherent in these factors of the situation. Secondly, there were parts of the country which by every test should be within the jurisdiction of the Government of Éire but which, in fact, were subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Northern Ireland. Thirdly, there was the problem of the presence of British troops in certain Éire ports.

These, among other considerations, would make the position of the Government of Éire one of great difficulty in the event of the outbreak of a major war. Moreover, that Government would be gravely handicapped by its inability to make any proper plans in advance. It would be realised how difficult it would be for the Government of Éire to impose taxation for increased Defence, which taxation in present circumstances their people could not, in fact, bear. If the position was envisaged in which Great Britain was involved in hostilities and Éire was perhaps indirectly involved, clearly the necessary preparations could not be made unless the people were enthusiastically behind their Government in supporting the necessary Defence measures.

If it was possible to secure a satisfactory settlement of all the outstanding differences between the two countries he (Mr. de Valera) was satisfied that it would be possible to secure such enthusiasm and support throughout Éire for Defence measures as would make the country so strong that no Power would venture to attack her. He need hardly point out how advantageous this would be to Great Britain. In this way not only would Éire be in a position to preserve her independence but she would be able effectively to prevent any enemy of Britain from using her as a base from which to attack the United Kingdom.

There were certain vital and fundamental considerations. In the first place the unity of the whole of Ireland must be secured, and the present state of affairs in the six Counties under which one section of the population, which was armed, was able to coerce another section, must be terminated. Secondly, the Government of Éire must obtain complete sovereignty over the ports now held by the United Kingdom in their country; and thirdly in order that Éire might be able to find the necessary money for rearmament she must be relieved of the burden of the present special duties, etc., which the United Kingdom had imposed upon her.

He hoped that the Conference would open with the idea of securing improved relations between the two countries instead of, as in the past, each country being a source of irritation and annoyance to the other. There was no need for him at the moment further to particularise his point of view as he had already spoken to Mr. MacDonald and had explained his attitude fully to him.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that it was evident that the questions which would have to be discussed ranged over a fairly wide field and would have to be taken in some kind of order. All the questions were closely connected with one another and he hoped that in the course of discussion it would be possible to construct a general picture and to see how far it was possible to reconcile the points of view of the two Governments.

PARTITION

As regards the question of partition the position so far as the United Kingdom was concerned was simple. The United Kingdom Government regarded partition as a matter which would have to be discussed between the Governments of Éire and Northern Ireland. The Government of the United Kingdom would not in principle be disposed to object to any arrangement which might be freely and voluntarily entered into between the two Irish Governments, but it must be clearly understood that they would impose no sort of pressure or coercion on Northern Ireland in the matter. He could not too strongly emphasise that an agreement freely and voluntarily entered into between Éire and Northern Ireland would meet with no opposition from the Government of the United Kingdom and Mr. de Valera could be assured that in the event of such an agreement being reached he need fear no difficulties of any sort so far as the United Kingdom was concerned.

MR. DE VALERA said that partition was the creation of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and in his view it was not open to the Government of the United Kingdom to wash their hands of any responsibility in the matter. That Government was in fact responsible for the happenings in Northern Ireland. It was quite impossible for the Government of Éire to make contact or any agreement with the Government of Northern Ireland without the support of the Government of the United Kingdom.

MR. de Valera mentioned factors such as the presence of British troops in Ulster and the various subsidies paid by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Northern Ireland which, in his view, constituted a powerful inducement to Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. He also referred to the position in South Down of which he had long been the Representative in the Northern Ireland Parliament and where, in his view, the inhabitants were being deprived of their civil rights and subjected to various kinds of unjust and improper coercion, the consequence of which might well in the long run be highly deplorable. The Government of Éire considered that the Government of the United Kingdom were responsible for partition and for the injustices and inequalities suffered by a large section of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland. If the Government of the United Kingdom adopted the attitude that the matter was no concern of theirs he felt that no progress towards improving relations between the two countries was possible. There were great dangers inherent in the situation and he much feared the continuance of the present critical state of affairs which might well develop into one of considerable danger. If the problem of partition was not solved it was inevitable that agitation and grave unrest must continue on an increasing scale and that incidents might occur which would be misunderstood by the Government and people of the United Kingdom.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether Mr. de Valera did not think that the present state of feeling on both sides of the border was much too unfavourable to offer any prospects of a settlement between the two Irish Governments and accordingly would it not be wiser policy to endeavour to secure an improvement of those conditions as a result of which the people themselves would come to realise the advantages of a united Ireland.

MR. DE VALERA referred to the basis which had been adopted for settling the boundary between Éire and Northern Ireland and contended that in many places including Newry, South Down, South Armagh and Fermanagh the wishes of the inhabitants had in fact been disregarded. This question of partition had caused a deeper and more intense feeling throughout Ireland than any other question. It was this question which had caused him (Mr. de Valera) first to take an active part in politics. In his view the great change which had taken place throughout the country in regard to Mr. Redmond and his policy was mainly due to the action which had been taken in regard to partition. He fully realised the difficulties in the matter of the United Kingdom Government, but he must frankly state that really good relations between the two countries could not be secured unless this question was satisfactorily settled and he must warn the United Kingdom Ministers that he and his colleagues would hold themselves completely free to take such action, in support of their point of view, as they might think fit to do.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether Mr. de Valera did not think that agreement on the other outstanding questions would be of great help in improving the relations between the two countries.

MR. DE VALERA replied that throughout Ireland there was very great suspicion of all motives and actions of the United Kingdom. It was not believed that in Northern Ireland the people thought that the Government of the United Kingdom were indifferent as to whether Ireland was united or not. The general view would certainly be that the United Kingdom favoured a disunited Ireland. Undoubtedly the majority in Northern Ireland feared that in some way or other they might lose their majority and become a minority.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the suspicion that the United Kingdom desired the disunity of Ireland was a profound delusion. As he had said, the Government of the United Kingdom had no desire to prevent in any way a free and voluntary agreement between the two Irish Governments on the subject if such an agreement could be reached. He was sure that Mr. de Valera would recognise that in the present circumstances it would be impossible to bring about a united Ireland except by the employment of force against Northern Ireland.

MR. DE VALERA said that if he were in Mr. Chamberlain's position he would bring pressure to bear on Northern Ireland of a moral character.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said that he entirely agreed with what the Prime Minister had said on this subject. As Mr. de Valera was no doubt aware his views were those of a typical Conservative but he had never opposed the unity of Ireland, and in his view this was a development which in course of time might reasonably be expected to come of itself. He was well aware of the views of Lord Craigavon who was an eminently reasonable statesman and of other reasonable leaders in Northern Ireland, and also of public opinion in the United Kingdom. Any coercion or the mere suggestion of coercion was quite impossible and this was the fully considered view of every United Kingdom statesman who had studied the matter in the last twenty years. While he thought that a united Ireland was the ultimate solution, he was satisfied that it would only be possible to attain that end by greatly improved relations. Mr. de Valera had mentioned certain causes of complaint which he had against Northern Ireland. He would not, he felt sure, mind if he, Sir Samuel, stated that Northern Ireland had certain causes of complaint against Éire, as, for example, in regard to the special discriminatory duties. He was sure that it would never be possible to coerce Northern Ireland and accordingly if Mr. de Valera's objective was to be attained it would be necessary to persuade her. As a result of these discussions it was hoped that better relations between the United Kingdom and Éire would be promoted, and it might well result as a consequence that relations between Éire and Northern Ireland would, in turn, greatly improve.

MR. DE VALERA enquired what Sir Samuel Hoare meant by special discriminatory duties in the case of Northern Ireland. So far as he was aware Northern Ireland was affected by the discriminatory duties in precisely the same way as the rest of the United Kingdom and not to any greater extent. Whilst he was bound to admit that, in his view, the coercion of Northern Ireland would, in all the circumstances, be justifiable, he would not himself favour a policy of coercion as he was certain that this would merely create greater difficulties than it would solve. When United Kingdom Ministers spoke of coercion they should always remember that the majority in Northern Ireland were continuously coercing the minority.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE observed that Northern Ireland would probably retort by pointing to the hardships suffered by the minority in Éire.

MR. DE VALERA said that there was no real comparison in the two cases. The minority in Éire was insignificant in numbers and in other respects and was in any case in no position to cause the Government of Éire the least anxiety, but in Northern Ireland one-third of the total population constituted the minority and that large fraction ardently desired to transfer themselves to Éire. It was idle to talk of coercion when it was generally recognised that one-third of the population of Northern Ireland were, in fact, being coerced.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that if one-third of the population of Northern Ireland were transferred to Éire, Northern Ireland would be left with the remaining two-thirds and that the problem would then be as difficult if not more difficult of solution.

MR. DE VALERA agreed but said that he had never favoured, nor would he ever agree to, a solution of this character. When he had discussed the question with Mr. Lloyd George in 1920 he had advocated arrangements for the transference of Powers and guarantees for those who might be deprived of their civil rights. He repeated that in his opinion the United Kingdom Government were in a position to point out to Northern Ireland the great advantages that would accrue to Northern Ireland from unification and to exercise moral persuasion on Northern Ireland to accept that solution.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said it was very difficult to consider this suggestion when there were so many responsible persons in Northern Ireland and elsewhere who took the view that, as a result of recent constitutional changes and policies, Éire was breaking the connection between the two countries and drifting out of the British Commonwealth. The people of Northern Ireland attached enormous importance to their connection with the United Kingdom and greatly valued their membership of the Empire.

MR. DE VALERA expressed surprise that the hard-headed inhabitants of Northern Ireland were influenced by any sentimental considerations.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE assured Mr. de Valera that in this respect Northern Ireland was every bit as sentimental as Éire.

MR. DE VALERA maintained that the people of Éire would not have accepted any proposals on constitutional lines short of those which had now been embodied in the new Constitution. As a result of the adoption of the Constitution a position of relative stability had now been attained so far as Éire was concerned.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN doubted whether Northern Ireland would agree that a position of relative stability had been reached in Éire. In their view the Government of Éire were engaged in severing all the cords which bound them to the British Commonwealth. In his view what was really required was a complete restoration of confidence and it was only when confidence had been fully and genuinely restored that Éire could hope to look for some favourable response from Northern Ireland.

MR. DE VALERA said that he felt bound to warn the United Kingdom Ministers of the reaction in Éire which must result from their attitude. In particular, the position would be greatly strengthened of all those who had throughout maintained that there was no half-way house and that, therefore, the best solution would be for Éire to leave the Commonwealth. These persons maintained that their only hope was to see the United Kingdom involved in serious dangers and difficulties. He, on the other hand, favoured the maintenance of the strength of the British Commonwealth, frankly because he saw in such maintenance the best and most effective protection for his country. He hoped that the United Kingdom Ministers realised that there were many people of the Left Wing in Éire who welcomed the adage that 'England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity' and who would be only too ready to prepare accordingly.

MR. MACDONALD said that he had naturally given much thought to this problem. It was due to Mr. de Valera to say that from the outset he had put this question in the forefront of all the conversations which had taken place between them, and that he had always maintained with complete frankness that unless and until the Partition question could be satisfactorily settled no real good relations between the two countries were possible. His colleagues would agree that he had always faithfully passed on to them Mr. de Valera's views on this subject. Mr. de Valera believed, as did his colleagues and the people of Éire, that the United Kingdom Government were interested in the maintenance of Partition. He had always tried to remove this complete misconception of the position of the United Kingdom Government. It was no doubt true that among private individuals in the United Kingdom and elsewhere the opinion was held that partition should be maintained for its own sake but their view was not that of the Government of the United Kingdom which was that while there should be no coercion of or pressure on Northern Ireland, if Northern Ireland changed her present opinion and favoured unification, there would be no opposition of any sort or kind from the Government of the United Kingdom. Mr. de Valera, however, went somewhat further and said that if we were really sincere in what we said we could take steps to use moral persuasion. He entirely agreed with what Sir Samuel Hoare had said on this subject and he did not believe for a moment that any attempt by us on these lines would serve any useful purpose. Mr. de Valera had spoken of contributions made by the United Kingdom in aid of Northern Ireland. It should be remembered that the contributions made by Northern Ireland to the United Kingdom exceeded in amount those made by the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland. But even if we were to withhold all our contributions, the result in his opinion would be precisely the same, and Northern Ireland would still maintain her objection to any union with Éire. The United Kingdom could do nothing except work for improved relations in all other respects and by so doing improve relations between Éire and Northern Ireland and so bring about perhaps a better realisation in Northern Ireland that Éire had in fact reached the state of relative stability to which Mr. de Valera had referred. These were his views stated with all frankness and sincerity.

MR. DE VALERA said that as a result of the discussion each side was now in possession of the point of view of the other. It seemed to him that one very important part of the mission of himself and his colleagues to London must be left undone. Some patching in regard to other questions might be possible but it must be realised that the conference had failed to get down to bedrock.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that United Kingdom Ministers had to face the realities of the situation in precisely the same way as Mr. de Valera and his colleagues had to face them. As had been explained, the United Kingdom could not usefully exert any influence on Northern Ireland to unite with Éire, but he thought that if it was found possible to reach agreement in other respects, better relations would be created and this, in the course of time, might well enable the United Kingdom to act in a mediatory capacity between Éire and Northern Ireland.

MR. DE VALERA replied that in the position in which they found themselves it was almost impossible for the Ministers of Éire to bring about the conditions essential to an improvement of relations between the two countries. It seemed that we had got into a vicious circle. Unless some real effort was going to be made to end partition he was very much afraid that relations would deteriorate. The mere fact that in certain respects his Government had tended to move to the Right had much intensified the strength of the Left Wing in Éire.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired how far the feeling in Éire to which Mr. de Valera had referred was due to the suspicion that the United Kingdom Government was opposed to Irish unification.

MR. DE VALERA said that this view was held universally in Éire. Public opinion would never credit the United Kingdom Government with any different policy.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether the position would be changed if the United Kingdom made a public announcement on the subject.

MR. DE VALERA said that his public opinion would want action rather than words. The United Kingdom Government said that there should be no coercion, though in point of fact one-third of the population of Northern Ireland was being coerced. A public statement might help, but much would depend upon its terms.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that he was not sure that he fully appreciated the point about coercion. So far as he knew no-one had suggested that Northern Ireland should be compelled to join Éire. He himself detested coercion in any shape or form and he would have thought that the only possible way to secure unification was by the free and voluntary agreement of all the people concerned.

MR. DE VALERA did not dissent and said that he himself would be disposed to join with Northern Ireland if the United Kingdom attempted to coerce her by force. If he was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom he would say to Northern Ireland 'Cannot you play your part in bringing about greatly improved relations between the whole of Ireland and the United Kingdom'? The trouble was that Governments in the past had failed to seize their opportunities. The United Kingdom might at one time have made a comprehensive settlement with Mr. Redmond. It might well be that in the future regret would have to be expressed that the present Conference had failed to find a solution.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked what would be the reply if Northern Ireland said to us that they did not agree that this particular method was a solution of the problem?

MR. DE VALERA said that in those circumstances he would tell Northern Ireland plainly that as they refused to make any contribution they could not look for help from the United Kingdom.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said that Northern Ireland sincerely and honestly believed in the British Commonwealth, and thought that they would best serve Imperial interests by remaining as they were at present. They would maintain that Éire was drifting away from the Empire, and if they were to be convinced that their view was wrong it would first be necessary to establish confidence and secure much better relations than existed at present.

MR. DE VALERA repeated that in his view the main consideration in Northern Ireland was the fear of the majority that they might become a minority.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said that the difficulty was rooted in centuries of history. Any suggestion of coercion by the United Kingdom would provoke the maximum possible opposition in Ulster to unification.

MR. MacENTEE thought that an approach by Éire to Northern Ireland would be very difficult. The Treaty had contained a provision for Proportional Representation. This provision had been maintained in the Irish Free State and in Éire throughout because of the desire to be fair to the minority. On the other hand, Northern Ireland had abolished Proportional Representation and had gerrymandered the Constituencies in favour of the majority. The United Kingdom were in the position of a trustee for the minority of Northern Ireland and in the view of the Government of Éire they had failed in their duty as a trustee. Considerations of this kind created intense suspicion and made it very difficult to persuade public opinion in Éire to follow its Government. Secondly, the arrangements in Northern Ireland for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of law and order were open to grave criticism. The supporters of Éire in Northern Ireland were not treated properly. It was very difficult indeed for the Government of Éire to approach Northern Ireland. Would it not be possible for the United Kingdom Government to ask the Government of Northern Ireland to restore Proportional Representation and to secure proper treatment for the minority?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that speaking for himself he saw very great difficulty in approaching Northern Ireland by Éire at the present time. When the time came for such an approach the United Kingdom Government might be in a position to facilitate matters, but any approach now would merely be regarded by Northern Ireland as a betrayal by the United Kingdom. If, however, relations could be improved and confidence re-established between Éire and the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom would be in a very much better position to exercise mediatory influence. In his view it was not possible to carry this matter further, and he suggested that note should be taken of the respective points of view of the two countries and that the Meeting should agree at a later time to consider the possibility of the United Kingdom issuing a statement on their attitude towards unification.

MR. DE VALERA emphasised the difficulties of himself and his colleagues in regard to this matter. Public opinion in Éire would certainly regard it as a betrayal if agreement having been reached on other matters, no arrangement of any sort regarding Partition was made. In the absence of such an arrangement it would be very difficult indeed to conclude agreements on a number of matters which he would much like to see settled.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether Mr. de Valera meant that he thought that no useful purpose would be served by discussing the other outstanding questions.

MR. DE VALERA replied in the negative, but repeated that in the absence of some arrangement regarding Partition it was out of the question to hope to get greatly improved relations.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE observed that the only sure way of securing progress was to proceed step by step.

MR. DE VALERA said that he wished United Kingdom Ministers to realise that this question of Partition was a vital and fundamental issue to all Irish people, both at home and abroad.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that United Kingdom Ministers fully realised the position and difficulties of Mr. de Valera and his colleagues, but they felt themselves bound by the realities of the situation and could not help feeling that the re-establishment of confidence between Éire and Great Britain would pave the way for an improvement of relations between Éire and Northern Ireland. It must be remembered that if United Kingdom Ministers made a settlement which was not acceptable to the House of Commons the position would be much more difficult even than it was at present.

MR. DE VALERA said that the position was even more difficult for himself and his colleagues. A mistake made by Irish negotiators might well result in their country being plunged into turmoil. In England a mistake made by English negotiators would at most result in a change of Government.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired what subject Mr. de Valera would like to discuss next.

MR. DE VALERA suggested that they should discuss the question of the occupation by the United Kingdom of the ports.

The Meeting adjourned in order to secure the attendance of Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence.

THE DEFENDED PORTS

MR. DE VALERA said that the claim of Éire to the Defended Ports rested primarily on the doctrine of National Sovereignty. As the Irish people saw it, the presence of British detachments in these ports was nothing less than an act of aggression.

Secondly, the British occupation of the ports constituted a distinct danger. There was always the possibility of an attempt on the part of some section of the Irish population to eject the garrisons. It would be no pleasant duty for any Irish Government to employ force against persons making such an attempt.

The third point in his case related to the use of the ports. What did the United Kingdom Government want them for? He took it that the idea was to secure that no foreign power should make use of them for the purposes of an attack against the United Kingdom.

This object, he suggested, could be secured equally efficiently by different means. If the United Kingdom delegates had met him in a more satisfactory way over the Partition issue, he would have been able to go further. As things were, he was prepared to repeat (what he had already said in public) that the Irish people were prepared to take over the Treaty ports and, having done so, would organise themselves to prevent the ports from being used as bases of attack by any foreign power on the United Kingdom.

It might be objected that Éire did not possess sufficient strength for the purpose. It was true their strength was far smaller than that of this country. Up to the limit of their power, however, they would organise themselves for the task. Was it indeed likely that the people of Éire, having won their independence, would hesitate to take all possible steps to secure it?

Next, to the extent that the strength of Éire was insufficient, he was of the opinion that when the emergency came the Government of the day, in the exercise of its own judgment and responsibility, would take steps to obtain assistance. The natural direction in which to look for such assistance would be from the Government of the United Kingdom. That Government in its turn would be more secure for the purposes of the emergency if the help which they extended to Éire had been freely asked for by the Government of Éire.

His confidence would be complete if it were not for the attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards Partition. That attitude might result in a section of Irish opinion criticising their Government for inviting United Kingdom co-operation, while Irish freedom was still impaired. Those who took this line might point to the freedom obtained by the Succession States in Central Europe. These States had obtained their independence owing to the break-up of the Austrian Empire.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that this last argument did not rest on very solid foundations. At the present moment some of the Succession States did not feel too happy about their independence.

MR. DE VALERA appreciated the dangers of the European situation. Another analogy which occurred to him was that of the South African Republics. General Smuts had said to him that his (the General's) people were far freer now than in the days of the independent Republics. A war however had had to be waged before he could persuade all his people of the soundness of his opinion.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN did not doubt that the people of Éire, if they obtained the Treaty Ports, would do their best to defend them against all comers. So far as this country was concerned, he did not hesitate to say that (assuming that the ports had become the property of Éire) we should be ready and anxious to help in time of emergency, subject always to our other responsibilities at that time.

His anxiety, however, was not that the ports would not be defended. It was rather that the ports should be made available for the use of the United Kingdom forces. He was assured by the military experts that in the event of a major war (e.g. against Germany) it was most important that we should have their use for the assembly or the protection of convoys.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that Berehaven and Lough Swilly would, according to the best military opinion, be of special importance in the circumstances contemplated. As Mr. Chamberlain had said, the object was not so much to deny those ports to the enemy, but to use them for the purpose of protecting the vitally important shipping which brought us our supplies from Ireland itself, from the other Dominions, from the Far East, etc. For reasons of geography these ports were the best places from which anti-submarine operations could be carried out. This was the United Kingdom Government's primary use for the defended ports. A secondary use would be as assembly places for convoys.

Naturally if, for one reason or another, we were unable to use the defended ports, we should have to use United Kingdom ports for both the purposes which he had mentioned. They would, however, be only a second best.

The enemy submarine attack would obviously be directed against Éire as well as against the United Kingdom. It was, therefore, in the common interest for the forces of both countries to be able to use the ports.

The Éire Delegation would appreciate that what was expected from Germany, if that country became our opponent, was an attempt to force a decision by means of a short sharp war which would include an intensive attack against our shipping, food supplies and ports. The risk of actual invasion was not considered very great. So far as we were concerned, the submarine would remain one of Germany's chief weapons.

MR. DE VALERA said that Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Thomas Inskip had raised a new and difficult issue. If they had stopped at a demand that the treaty ports should be denied to the United Kingdom's enemies, he would have had no hesitation in saying that it might safely be left to whatever government was in power in Éire at the time to invite United Kingdom co-operation.

The moment, however, that the United Kingdom asked for the use of the ports by its own forces, as a right, the people of Ireland would suspect an encroachment on their territory. They would feel that it was no longer their own. Frankly, if he were asked to give his assent in advance to such an arrangement, he would have to refuse.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP did not see why there could not be a satisfactory understanding. A land-owner could give the use of his land for a particular purpose, but it remained his own.

MR. DE VALERA said that he personally would not take the responsibility of promising any such arrangement. He said this particularly in view of the fact that there appeared to be no hope of a genuine understanding with the United Kingdom. He was referring to the issue of partition in Northern Ireland.

As things were, he could not bind future governments of Ireland beyond the point which he had already mentioned. Anything further would have to be determined by events.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether he was right in gathering that Mr. de Valera might have returned a different answer if United Kingdom Ministers had met him over partition.

MR. DE VALERA said that this would have been so. The hatchet would have been buried, and things would have been fundamentally different. The Irish people would have realised that their own defence interests were best served by the United Kingdom and the overseas Dominions maintaining their strength. Éire would have contributed to the common strength of the Commonwealth. Past difficulties would have disappeared, and the people of Éire would have come to realise that our⁴ desire to use the ports in time of war was not for the purpose of interference in Irish affairs.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that it was certainly not our desire in any way to invade the sovereignty of Éire; our desire to use the ports was in the interests of our own existence. The last war had shown us how important they were.

He had to deal with public opinion in the United Kingdom just as Mr. de Valera had to deal with public opinion in Éire. What was he, Mr. Chamberlain, to say to public opinion here if he gave up the ports, the use of which was secured to this country by the 1921 Treaty, and received no assurance in exchange?

MR. DE VALERA said that public opinion appeared to give rise to equally insuperable difficulties on both sides.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that there were precedents for what United Kingdom Ministers were proposing, i.e., treaty arrangements with foreign countries, entitling us in certain circumstances to the use of points in their territory.

MR. DE VALERA could only say that he believed that when the time came the Irish people could be ready to co-operate.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that it was of considerable military importance to know in advance what facilities one was going to enjoy in war. In our own case we had our preparations to make and we must know whether they were to be preparations suitable for Berehaven or for Pembroke.

MR. DE VALERA realised the force of this. It was the urgent need of military preparation in the difficult conditions of the present time which had led him to propose the Conference.

SIR JOHN SIMON enquired whether Mr. de Valera contemplated the absolute transfer of the ports by this country to Éire, without any kind of assurance from Éire that they would be kept in a proper state of defence.

MR. DE VALERA said that he was prepared to give a public assurance and to implement it, that Éire would deny the defended ports to all other powers.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether Éire would agree to consult with this country regarding the nature of the defences required.

MR. DE VALERA said that he would have been able to go further if a real ending to the Anglo-Irish quarrel had been in prospect. In such circumstances it would have been the most natural thing for Éire to consult the United Kingdom.

As things were, Éire started with a strong desire not to become involved in war. She made her plans for resisting aggression from what ever quarter it came. Since, however, the likelihood existed that any enemy of the United Kingdom might consider using Éire as a base against the United Kingdom it followed that Éire's defensive system must be planned as part of a system common to the two countries.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that in modern conditions defensive systems had to be planned in advance.

MR. DE VALERA was afraid that the majority of the Irish people would be suspicious of any consultation in the ordinary sense, i.e., staff conversations.

There was, however, a lesser degree of consultation and to this he was prepared to pledge himself in public. The argument would be that the defensive system of Éire was planned to maintain the national independence; that the possibility existed of an enemy wishing to use Éire's ports against the United Kingdom; and that the further possibility existed of the Government of Éire asking for United Kingdom assistance in the defence of those ports. It followed from this that the defences of the ports must be planned to suit circumstances in which there would be co-operation with the United Kingdom.

More generally, the United Kingdom had considerable military experience and Éire had little. Éire must therefore look to the United Kingdom for technical advice. It was very desirable to arrange for interchangeability of equipment and spare parts between Éire and the United Kingdom.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP asked whether Mr. de Valera would agree that cooperation with the United Kingdom would bring important advantages to Éire.

MR. DE VALERA said that he fully realised the facts. Some of these facts, however, were difficult to explain on the other side of the Irish Sea. A very difficult situation would arise if any suggestions were made that the United Kingdom Government were going to have the use of the defended ports, except if the Government of Éire in the exercise of their own judgment asked for this form of co-operation.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he would be glad if Mr. de Valera would give the Meeting his candid opinion as to what would happen on the outbreak of a major war, if the United Kingdom had no rights in the defended ports.

MR. DE VALERA said that he would give his opinion without reference to the question of partition in Northern Ireland. His estimate was that on the outbreak of war some sections of the Irish people would be inclined to hold out against co-operation with the United Kingdom. The Government of Éire would be in a position to draw attention to the considerations which told in favour of co-operation, e.g. the danger of interruption to the food supply, but the whole of the Irish people would not be convinced. The Government of Éire might say to the Government of the United Kingdom, assuming that friendly relations existed between the two Governments, 'our people do not yet realise the position; we shall have to wait before we can ask for your assistance'.

If the probabilities were as he thought, he would advise the United Kingdom Government to lay their plans on the basis that the Irish Defended Ports would not be available to them. They should provide, however, for the possibility of switching over to the use of the Irish Ports at a later stage. It would be the height of unwisdom for the United Kingdom Government to make any more favourable assumption.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE asked whether Mr. de Valera could not go a little farther. Was it not possible to draw a distinction in advance between situations obviously of interest to Éire and situations not of interest to Éire?

MR. DE VALERA thought this quite impossible. It must be left to the Government of Éire of the day to consider where their country's interests lay.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said that the next war was expected to be entirely different from that of 1914/18. If Germany was involved she was expected to stake everything on bringing the war to an end within a few weeks or months. There would be no question of any preparations being useful which were not in readiness at the outset. He envisaged a great concentrated attack on the means of existence of both the United Kingdom and Éire.

MR. DE VALERA said that if he were persuaded of this view he would say that it was both the interest and the duty of the Government of Éire to start at once preparations in the defended ports (i.e. on the assumption that the ports were theirs). It was possible of course that the burden of preparation might become too great for Éire to carry.

Before the Government of Éire would take these steps they must be convinced that they were necessary in their own interest.

MR. MACDONALD asked how far Mr. de Valera would be prepared to go in such matters as consultation on defence plans and the interchangeability of equipment.

MR. DE VALERA said that he was personally satisfied of the necessity of these measures in the interests of the people of Éire. He would do his best to lead his people in that direction.

If the Government of Éire took over the ports, and if it were left entirely clear that they were free agents in taking their decision, they could probably say frankly for what purpose they were organising their defences in those parts of the country. They might be able to say, without much danger, that the possibility existed that Éire would be used as the base for an attack on the United Kingdom; that plans were being made which included the possibility of asking for assistance from the United Kingdom; and that consultations were taking place with that possibility in view.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN supposed that an Irish ship would have to be torpedoed before the people of Éire would take the situation seriously.

MR. MacENTEE thought that the principal thing necessary was that the Government of the United Kingdom should use their efforts to bring North and South together. If they were successful Irish opinion might develop with remarkable rapidity.

MR. DE VALERA did not altogether agree with his colleague that Irish opinion on defence questions could be expected in any circumstances to develop rapidly. Time would be required.

One fact of the situation was that the Government of Éire had an incomplete knowledge of the dangers of the international situation. They realised that re-armament was most expensive and they did not wish to spend money in the wrong directions.

They had not of course the vast financial resources of the United Kingdom, and they would soon feel the pinch if they spent any considerable sums on armaments. As he had pointed out in the 1932 conversations with the United Kingdom Government, the latter had gone off with all the assets of the former partnership⁵. They ought to be paying money to Ireland.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that finance might be left until a little later. What else could be done to make the defences of Éire effective? This country was in a position to give Éire much helpful information in such matters as anti-aircraft defence.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE suggested that much could be done without any publicity by talks between experts. After these the Government of Éire would be in a position to place their orders.

MR. DE VALERA saw no objection of principle, provided that it was made clear that co-operation with the United Kingdom was not a fundamental point of Irish defence, but was being undertaken with a view to a particular contingency.

MR. MACDONALD said that there was a similar understanding between this country and the other Dominions.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether the Government of Éire contemplated setting up munitions factories. If the United Kingdom Government wanted to purchase some of the products of those factories, would there be any objection?

MR. DE VALERA agreed that it was desirable to set up munitions factories in Éire. He thought that there would be no objection to United Kingdom purchases from them, provided it were clear that the primary object of the factories was to supply the needs of Éire. There was of course the danger that the Government of Éire might be regarded as committing themselves in advance to a situation in which they would co-operate in war with the United Kingdom Government.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out the enormous range of materials involved in modern armaments. The purchase from the Irish factories might, for example, be not shells, but merely certain components for shells.

He had mentioned the matter because he had thought that the Government of Éire might be glad of orders. So far as the United Kingdom Government were concerned, they could probably provide for their own requirements in this country.

MR. DE VALERA said that he would not rule out the possibility of supplying the United Kingdom Government. The first business of the Irish factories, however, would be the equipment of the forces of Éire.

Turning again to the question of the defended ports, Mr. de Valera said that it had occurred to him that in view of the great development of aircraft these ports might now be of less importance to the United Kingdom.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that, on the contrary, the importance of the defended ports had increased. Berehaven and Lough Swilly were now considered to be of the greatest importance for anti-submarine operations. The technique, in a word, was to get as near as possible to the point of assembly of the enemy submarines.

FINANCE AND TRADE

On the invitation of Mr. Chamberlain, MR. DE VALERA opened the discussion on this item. The first point on which he wished to insist related to the Land Annuities. United Kingdom Ministers were familiar with the view taken of this matter in Éire, and it was unnecessary to argue the case again. The Government of Éire felt very strongly the injustice of being called upon to make payments which they did not regard as due.

His second point was the necessity for looking ahead in economic matters.

He wished to see the agricultural industry of Éire built up, with the result that food supplies in time of crises would be insured. The industry's production could be greatly increased. It was possible that it could even be doubled. The great obstacle in the way was the penal tariffs imposed by the United Kingdom.

He did not, however, envisage a purely agricultural economic life for Éire. Without embarking on unnecessary developments he wished to see his country produce as many manufacturing goods as it reasonably could. His Government could not forego their right to build up their industries.

On the other hand, there were certain classes of manufacture in which Éire would be ill-advised to compete, on account of its small population.

Éire had considerable need for capital equipment.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thanks Mr. de Valera for his opening statement. He was afraid, however, that something more remained to be said. This country had not desired an economic war with Éire. Our special duties had only been imposed in order to recoup ourselves for the monies which we believed to have been unjustly withheld from us.

It was to be hoped that the present Conference would result in new financial and economic arrangements acceptable to both countries.

MR. DE VALERA said that so far as the R.I.C. Pensions were concerned, the people of Éire looked upon that Organisation as an armed force maintained by Britain for Imperial purposes and they would not regard it as reasonable to pay the pensions of members. They also considered Éire's responsibility for a share in the public debt of Gt. Britain as absolved by the 1925 Agreement. Indeed, so far as the merits were concerned, they thought that an examination of both sides of the account would show that payments were not due from Éire to Gt. Britain and that they were taking a generous line if they did not look for some repayment from Gt. Britain.

SIR JOHN SIMON said he thought it would be a good plan for both sides to face the situation as it existed to-day, and to see whether means could not be found for negotiating an improvement in it. Éire wished to increase her exports but, for reasons which were well appreciated, Gt. Britain had imposed certain duties in answer to which Éire had been obliged to introduce export bounties. The position, in fact, approximated to one of economic war and was deplored by both sides. On the assumption, for the moment, that Gt. Britain's claim was sound, they originally expected to receive in round figures £5 million per annum from the Free State, made up of just over £3 million in respect of the land annuities; a further £11/2 million in respect of R.I.C. Pensions and Local Loans, and £1/2 million per annum for compensation for damage to property. The latter item, had, in fact, been paid regularly. That arrangement, never mind for what reason, broke down and special measures were instituted by which this country received in round figures some £4 million per annum, plus the £1/2 million in respect of compensation to damaged property. These measures had led to other counter measures and the whole position seemed rather unfortunate. His suggestion would be that the facts of the present situation should be taken as a basis and an endeavour made to see whether, by looking at it from a practical point of view, some suitable adjustment could not be made. The House of Commons would undoubtedly continue to authorise the machinery which brought in £4 million per annum for as long as it was necessary, but he would like to be able to go to Parliament and say that some adjustment had been reached in the interests of a better general understanding all round. It might, for example, be possible to reduce the special duties in the hope that Éire would consider whether there were not some other items of expenditure at present borne by the British Exchequer which they would undertake to meet, for example the pensions of Ex-Service men living in Ireland.

MR. DE VALERA thought that there would be difficulties in the way of meeting the cost of that particular item.

SIR JOHN SIMON observed that the question of financial adjustment and improved trade went hand in hand and the topics should be dealt with as a connected whole. Mr. de Valera was anxious for a bigger outlet for Irish produce in British markets and arrangements to this end should be part of a trade agreement to be included in a general settlement.

MR. DE VALERA said that a reduction only of the special Import Duties was not the best way of approaching the problem. So long as these were continued at all they would give the effect that economic warfare was being continued. He recognised that Great Britain was in a position to extract contributions from Éire. If they had been able to find a way of resisting the extraction they would be adopting it at present. It was difficult to suggest the best method of approach, but he did not think it could be done on the basis that the Irish people would be prepared to enter into an agreement to buy off the duties. If, however, a solution could be found on the basis of making a certain payment, it would have to be made clear that such a payment did not include anything in respect of the land annuity claim. There was no chance of coming to a financial settlement if payments were to be made under that head. If the Import Duties were to continue there would be no point in making a financial agreement. On the other hand, if the financial difficulties could be suitably adjusted, perhaps on agreement of a sum to be paid, negotiations for a trade agreement could go on independently on a purely trade basis. He added, however, that any general agreement would have to take into account the increased burdens on the country that would be imposed by the development of a Defence Programme. All these aspects were interlocked, and it was difficult to know exactly how a start should be made.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether Mr. de Valera contemplated the payment of a lump sum.

MR. DE VALERA replied that it would depend on the terms of settlement. Such a basis had advantages and disadvantages, but in as much as they desired to lay the foundations of good relations between the two countries the sooner continuing payments ceased to be made the better; so far as they were in respect of items which Irish people were not convinced were due they would always give rise to agitation. Proceeding, he said that there would be difficulty in doing anything to meet the cost of R.I.C. pensions even if restricted to pensioners living in Éire. Apart from the feeling of the country that this force constituted a special type of army organised to preserve British Imperial power, they were not satisfied that the apportionment of the total cost of pensions was fair to the Free State, based as it was on the geographical distribution of the force.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that the difficulties might to some extent be mitigated if the payments were made in capitalised form.

SIR JOHN SIMON recognised the force of popular feeling in Éire in the case of the R.I.C. pensions. He asked whether the same feelings would operate against judicial, civil and revenue pensions.

MR. DE VALERA said he thought there would not be the same difficulty.

MR. MacENTEE enquired whether a particular appropriation was really necessary to meet specific items.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that, from his own point of view, he did not think this country could face a financial agreement under which they gave up revenue to the extent of £4 million without something to replace at least part of it. He did not rule out discharge of the special duties as part of an agreement but unless they were covered by some concessions from Éire in another direction the gap of £4 million would still remain unfilled. He did not think that it was necessary to earmark every item that might help to fill the gap so long as their total added up to a reasonable sum. Would it be possible, for example, for their Government to make some contribution towards the Ex-Service pensioners in so far as they lived in Éire?

MR. DE VALERA said that he could not take responsibility for such an undertaking, apart from the fact that he did not accept the view that such a payment was in any way an Éire liability. His Government were prepared to go a certain distance to reach a settlement. He had already told Mr. MacDonald that, though on the general merits he did not think that any payment should be made, in view of the special circumstances, he thought that a compromise was possible on some items, though not on all. He was therefore prepared to examine them in detail to see how far it would be possible to deal with them.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought the difficulty was one of presentation. Could they not put it that in return for the cancellation of the payments at present in default Éire was prepared to make a lump sum payment equivalent to the capitalised value of the special duties and to make other adjustments in the form of a Trade Treaty?

MR. DE VALERA said that he would have to explain the basis of the calculation. His Government had stated that they would go out of Office rather than pay the Land Annuities.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that the proposal was to wipe out the Land Annuities.

MR. DE VALERA agreed, but observed that they would have to be free to point out, in regard to any settlement that might be made, that they were not paying Land Annuities but only a sum considered suitable in the circumstances to end the economic war. The form of such announcement might not be very satisfactory to this country.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he did not see anything inacceptable in putting it in the way proposed.

MR. DE VALERA thought that a start could be made on that basis, and that a detailed examination of the items should be carried out by officials. The most objectionable feature was the payment in regard to R.I.C. Pensions.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that the mention of specific items could be avoided.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that the Land Annuities represented some £3,000,000 per annum out of the £5,000,000 per annum which this country originally expected to receive. A proposal to reduce a lump sum payment representing the capitalised value of the Special Duties by the equivalent of the Land Annuities would require very serious consideration.

MR. MacENTEE observed that there was more in the matter than a mere reduction in payments. There was to be a new beginning between the two countries and the differences between them were to be resolved.

MR. MACDONALD pointed out that the terms of any agreement reached would have to be acceptable to the House of Commons.

MR. MacENTEE said that, for their part, they would be unable to carry through any agreement in which they acknowledged responsibility for payment of the Land Annuities.

MR. DE VALERA pointed out that the sum involved was relatively a much more serious matter for Éire than for Great Britain in view of the taxable capacities of the two countries. A million pounds raised by Éire was equivalent to many million pounds raised in Britain.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN observed that on this basis a remission of payments to Great Britain was of relatively greater importance to Éire. He looked at the question from a practical point of view rather than from one of principle. Provided agreement could be reached on a basis which would bring Great Britain a sum which they considered reasonable, their view would not be affected if, under the agreement, they gave up payments to which they might be justly entitled.

MR. DE VALERA said that his Government was in a difficult position. He had been returned to power in spite of the sufferings in Éire caused by the economic war. It would be necessary to have another Government in Éire if responsibility for the Land Annuities was to be recognised.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the British Government were not asking for the payment of Land Annuities or R.I.C. Pensions. They would be prepared to take off the Special Duties in return for a lump sum payment not less than the capitalised value of those Duties, plus some further compensation in the sphere of trade.

MR. DE VALERA recognised that, whatever sum was fixed, there would no doubt be criticism as to its reasonableness. He must be in a position to convince his people that they were not being saddled with a burden which they could not carry, and that he had not got rid of one burden to replace it by another.

So far as the Defence programme was concerned, it must be clear that Éire was providing for its own purposes and defending its own country. If it was thought to be assisting Britain directly or indirectly it would at once be asked why they should pay.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that the experts should get together to see whether, in the light of their discussion, some basis could be found for a possible financial agreement. Proceeding, he asked what would be the basis for a trade agreement.

MR. DE VALERA said that they would have to proceed on the basis that they could not allow industries which had recently been started in Éire to be destroyed by competition with this country. Some form of protection for them would have to be continued. On the other hand where there was an open market they would be prepared to grant preferences to this country of an amount to be agreed upon.

MR. LEMASS said that exports from Éire were rather less than half the imports and that the adverse trade balance, in spite of invisible exports, had increased since the special duties were imposed. There was not, therefore, much room for any large expansion in imports, but he thought that there was scope for some change in their origin.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he understood that the openings which Éire sought for her exports were mainly agricultural and he thought it would be useful to hear the views of Mr. Morrison.

MR. MORRISON said that he felt sure that Mr. Ryan, as a fellow-sufferer in the world of agricultural difficulties, would appreciate that the prospect of increased imports into Britain of Irish agricultural produce would not be hailed with great enthusiasm by the agricultural population of this country. At the same time if increased openings for such produce would contribute towards a general trade agreement the matter was clearly one for discussion. The market situation in this country was, however, not the same as that existing before the present difficulties with Éire started. In the interval[,] powers had been secured and an organisation built up to prevent unregulated imports of agricultural products which would threaten the stability of markets. Éire herself, for example, was a member of the world Beef Conference. The regulation of imports would clearly have to continue. He mentioned the point because Mr. de Valera, earlier in the meeting, had made use of the expression 'free entry'. No one now had a free entry into the agricultural markets of this country.

MR. DE VALERA observed that special considerations were applicable to Éire. In making preparations against a crisis he thought it would be fundamental for this country to wish to see agricultural development carried out near at hand. The food supply that could be produced in Éire might not constitute a big fraction of the total food requirements of Great Britain, but it might prove extremely valuable to tide over a period of special difficulty. What made Éire different from Canada or Australia was its close proximity to this country.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN agreed that such a supply would be very valuable provided it could be brought over to this country.

MR. DE VALERA said he thought things would be in a very bad way if communications could not be kept open between Britain and Éire.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN observed that it might depend on the extent to which this country was allowed facilities for submarine hunting.

MR. DE VALERA said that the existence of a good market for their supplies would be conducive towards dealing satisfactorily with the common interests of the two countries. As regards the regulation of imports he recognised the necessity for this but he hoped that a bigger proportion would come from Éire than was the case at present.

MR. MACDONALD observed that Mr. de Valera had suggested that it was more important to this country that the agricultural industry in Éire should be in a flourishing condition than that of certain Dominions or oversea countries, and he drew the conclusion that agricultural produce from Éire should be treated possibly better, or at any rate as well as, that from Canada or Australia. It would be difficult to persuade other Dominions that this was a reasonable procedure if those Dominions gave better treatment to imports from this country into their countries that Éire was prepared to do.

MR. STANLEY added that the other Dominions made appreciable contributions in return for the treatment accorded agricultural produce imported into Gt. Britain from them. The tariff concessions granted by them in exchange went beyond the mere giving of preferences over foreign competitors and cut into the systems designed to protect their own industries. It would be difficult to explain the position to them if no corresponding contribution was made in the case of Éire.

MR. LEMASS observed that the cost of transport over the long distances to the overseas Dominions in itself provided some form of protection which did not exist in the case of Éire. The scope for making concessions was further restricted by the comparatively small size of the Éire market.

MR. STANLEY suggested that it might be possible to make a good deal of progress by looking into the position with regard to a number of individual items.

MR. LEMASS said they were quite prepared to do this. It might well be possible to give preferences over other countries in respect of classes of goods of which manufacture in Éire was not practicable.

MR. MORRISON said that agricultural produce covered a large variety of products and the economics of each branch of the industry were different. The arrangements for marketing the produce varied with each product and no general picture could be presented until the questions of pigs and eggs, etc., had each been separately considered. He thought, however, that it was necessary to make clear the general principle that it would not be possible to contemplate excluding Éire produce from the regulations which were applicable to agricultural produce not only from other parts of the world, but also from the Home industry.

Agreements had been reached on the coal-cattle pact in the past and he felt confident that it would be possible to do the same again in the future⁶. The argument that agricultural development in Éire strengthened the position of this country could not be advanced here with the same assurance as Mr. de Valera used since it provoked the retort that the position would be still better if the development took place in Gt. Britain.

MR. DE VALERA said that he thought it would be more difficult for an industrially minded nation, such as Gt. Britain, to carry out agricultural development than for a country such as Éire to do so. In Éire the difficulty at present was to prevent the agricultural population leaving the land.

MR. MORRISON said that the same position existed in this country.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said that he wanted to draw attention to the case of the United Kingdom trade with Éire proceeding through Northern Ireland. He understood that this was the category of British trade which had suffered most from the duties imposed by Éire, and that it had been specially hit by certain taxes. He did not propose to go into the matter in detail but it was a factor which could not be ignored in the discussions on the trade agreement.

MR. DE VALERA said that they had taken no deliberate steps against Northern Ireland by reason of the imposition of the Special Duties by Great Britain. One of the reasons why he would like to see a Trade agreement was that it might result in the removal of certain fears held by the North in regard to trade barriers. He thought that a settlement between North and South would be of great advantage to the Northern Linen manufacturers. When he was in America he found that a number of supporters of the Irish Independence Movement had organised a deliberate campaign to boycott Belfast linen.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that the next step was for the experts from Éire to meet the Treasury Officials with a view to reaching a basis for settlement in regard to the Special Duties. This should be explored before proceeding to deal with the problem of a Trade agreement.

CONCLUSIONS

THE CONFERENCE agreed:

(a) To issue the communiqué to the Press which was drafted by Mr. MacDonald and read to the Conference by Mr. Chamberlain⁷.

(b) That Mr. de Valera and Mr. MacDonald should agree the general lines on which they should reply to Press enquiries.

(c) That experts from Éire should meet Treasury officials on the morning of 18th January with a view to exploring the basis of a settlement in regard to the Special Import Duties⁸.

(e) To resume the discussion at No. 10 Downing Street, at 12 noon on Tuesday, 18th January, 1938⁹.