Minutes of the conference between representatives of the United Kingdom and Ireland
(Secret) (I.N. (38) 2^nd Meeting) (Copy)

CONFERENCE
between
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ÉIRE

Secretary's Notes of the Second Meeting of the Conference held at 10 Downing Street, on Tuesday, 18th January, 1938, at 12 Noon

PRESENT
UNITED KINGDOM	ÉIRE
The Rt. Hon Neville Chamberlain, M.P., Prime Minister.	Mr. Eamon de Valera, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs.
The Rt. Hon. Sir John Simon, G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., O.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Commerce. Exchequer.	Mr. Sean F. Lemass, Minister for Industry and Commerce
The Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Bt., G.C.S.I., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department.	Mr. Sean MacEntee, Minister for Finance.
The Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, M.P., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.	Dr. James Ryan, Minister for Agriculture.
THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT
The Rt.Hon. Sir Thomas Inskip, C.B.E., K.C., M.P., Minister for Co-ordination of Defence.	Mr. J. W. Dulanty, C.B., C.B.E., High Commissioner for Éire.

Secretary

Mr. W.D. Wilkinson, D.S.O., M.C.

THE DEFENDED PORTS

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he and his colleagues of the United Kingdom Delegation had been giving further thought to the question of the defended ports, in the light of yesterday's discussion¹. If they could, they were anxious to meet Mr. de Valera in this matter; they would take as sympathetic a view as possible. On the other hand, the United Kingdom Delegation were not sure that they had been successful in conveying to Mr. de Valera and his colleagues the extent and the serious nature of their fears regarding the shipping and food supply situation in the next major war. They had attempted yesterday to indicate what a dangerous weapon the submarine was expected to be in the next war; but he doubted whether Mr. de Valera had appreciated how essential it was that the necessary anti-submarine precautions should be ready to start from the moment hostilities broke out. It was no use saying that the Government of Éire of the day must be trusted to take the proper steps, in the exercise of its unfettered judgment. That would probably mean not until a few Irish ships had been sunk. Measures taken at that stage might be altogether too late to save the situation.

He felt bound to bring this important matter to Mr. de Valera's notice once more. Had the latter given it further thought, and was he prepared to go further than he had indicated on the previous day?

MR. DE VALERA said that he had given much thought to this matter, not only since the previous day, but on many occasions in the past. He hoped that he had appreciated the defence considerations to which Mr. Chamberlain had referred. Nevertheless, he (Mr. de Valera) was afraid that he could not take the further step which Mr. Chamberlain suggested. It raised formidable difficulties. On the other hand, if the Conference had made any progress over the partition issue, the atmosphere in Éire would have been very different, and the facts of the situation could have been explained to the people of Éire in a much more convincing way.

As it was, he (Mr. de Valera) could only repeat what he had already said in public, namely, that it was in the interest of the people of Éire to build up their defences; that Éire would not permit any foreign power to make use of the defended ports for the purpose of attacking the United Kingdom; that the two countries stood in common peril of an attack; that plans must be made to meet this common emergency; and that it must be left to the Government of Éire to decide when the time had come to bring those plans into operation.

He could not contemplate adding to such a statement anything which might be construed as admitting an infringement of the national sovereignty of Éire. If he did, he would be laying up trouble for the future. Indeed, he felt certain that trouble would flare up almost immediately. He was afraid he could go no further on this point - even if it should prove to be the point on which the Conference broke.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked Sir Thomas Inskip whether it would be practicable that the United Kingdom defence plans for the emergency contemplated should (a) proceed on the assumption that the defended ports would not be available, but should nevertheless (b) take account of the possibility that they might become available at a later stage.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that plans conceived on those lines would not be entirely satisfactory. As had been said on the previous day, they would only be 'a second best'. It would be understood that the submarine hunting plans of the Naval Staff depended largely on the certainty that particular equipment would be present when war came in a particular place.

MR. DE VALERA was afraid that agreement on 'the second best' was all there was any hope of getting now. If his Government went a step further, it would be tantamount to running away from everything for which they had stood in the past.

It was his firm hope, however, that step-by-step relations between the two countries would improve, until the point was reached when the vast majority of Irish people would want to play their part in any common emergency.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE said that, speaking as a former First Lord of the Admiralty, he knew that the essential thing in anti-submarine precautions was to have ready on the spot, before hostilities started, a proper supply of nets, booms, etc. The United Kingdom and Éire were facing a common peril. Would Éire be ready to make the preparations he had mentioned?

MR. DE VALERA thought that the answer would be in the affirmative. The people of Éire, however, would want it clearly demonstrated to them that these precautions were measures of self-defence. If anything was done which went beyond the limits of self-defence, all hope of securing the willing cooperation of Éire would be at an end. If he were to say that he would go beyond that point, his colleagues in Dublin would not support him.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that considerable scientific study of anti-submarine tactics had been made in this country since the last War. The question was whether, on the basis suggested by Mr. de Valera, the United Kingdom authorities would be justified in communicating to the authorities of Éire the results of all this research.

MR. DE VALERA was certain that the authorities of Éire had never yet betrayed any confidence which the United Kingdom Government had seen fit to place in them. He was most anxious to employ efficient and up-to-date methods in his defence preparations. The one thing certain was that the United Kingdom and Éire would not be on opposite sides in war. The fact was that they were faced with a common peril. The right course was clearly that their respective staffs should lay their plans for acting together promptly, if their Governments gave the word.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether Mr. de Valera contemplated defence plans which should include provision for the use of the defended ports by the United Kingdom authorities, i.e. when the Government of Éire of the day so decided, not automatically on the outbreak of war.

MR. DE VALERA assented, on the clear understanding that it would be for the Government of Éire to determine when the moment had come.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that it was the logical consequence of Mr. de Valera's view that staff conversations and joint planning should take place in time of peace. To some extent Mr. de Valera's assent had reduced his anxieties for the future.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that mutual confidence was the only possible basis for such consultations. Joint planning would have to be based on the communication of a considerable part of the results of the scientific research to which he had already referred.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that, like the Government of Éire, the Government at Westminster had to defend their actions to Parliament and to their public opinion. He was afraid that public opinion in this country would find it very difficult to stomach the handing over of the defended ports without any assurance that United Kingdom forces were to have the use of those ports in war.

Mr. de Valera had said that it was impossible for him to give such an assurance. Let it be assumed for the moment that the United Kingdom Government were prepared to waive their demand for that assurance. The United Kingdom Government could in those circumstances properly ask for another kind of assurance, viz. an assurance as to what Éire was prepared to do to put the defences of the ports into a satisfactory condition of readiness.

MR. DE VALERA said that this was mainly a question of £.s.d. It was clear, for example, that Éire would not be able to afford expenditure on this scale at the present moment, when the economic war was in full swing and the penal duties were unrepealed.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked what idea Mr. de Valera had formed regarding the speed at which the defended ports could be modernised.

MR. DE VALERA said that everything again turned on the partition issue, on which he had found the United Kingdom Government to be unhelpful. If they had been able to bury the hatchet, he would have done his utmost to arouse the enthusiasm of the Irish people on the defence question. He would have said to them 'Britain is not now among our possible enemies. The British have left the defended ports. It is our duty to see that their action in leaving is not going to expose them to a foreign attack based on those ports'. He would then have set about a recruiting campaign.

In the present circumstances it was more difficult to answer Mr. Chamberlain's question. He would put things in this way. The two countries were faced with a common peril. One of them was relatively ignorant of war. Would the other advise her in what way she could best utilise her available strength? Assuming that the United Kingdom communicated the relevant part of their plans, the Government of Éire would (a) adopt this part of the British plans as their own plan against the common peril, and would (b) super-impose on it other plans to meet other perils.

The Government of Éire had not reached a decision as to the amount of money they would be able to spend on defence. It was clear that they would have to shoulder a heavy burden. At present their army was a mere skeleton force. It would need expansion and in addition the enrolment of some kind of volunteer force. Mr. de Valera realised, however, that the United Kingdom advice to him might be to spend the money available on small naval vessels or coast defences, rather than on increasing the army.

He would hope to commend this policy to his people, basing himself on the fundamental plea that they had obtained their freedom and must now be prepared to defend it. He realised that United Kingdom Ministers might find his statement rather vague. The fact was that at the present moment the Government of Éire did not know what direction their planning ought to take.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked whether Mr. de Valera wished the defended ports to be handed over to Éire complete with the defences and other works in them.

MR. DE VALERA said that what he hoped for was the denunciation of Articles 6 and 7 of the 1921 Treaty².

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether, leaving the Treaty aside for the moment, Mr. de Valera contemplated that e.g. the guns in the defended ports were to be handed over. It might be very difficult to defend such handing over to public opinion in this country.

MR. DE VALERA said that he imagined the guns were obsolete and useless.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought this was not the case. Although somewhat out of date, they would still be of value. Let it be assumed for the sake of argument that the defended ports, with everything in them, were handed over to Éire. How was the United Kingdom Government to know that the Éire authorities were going to bring the defences of the ports up to a higher standard, instead of merely 'sitting back'? Would Mr. de Valera put his hand to an undertaking to this effect?

MR. DE VALERA said that he would find it easier to make a statement in his Parliament than to give a written assurance. He would be prepared to say in his Parliament 'we shall keep up our defences, including the defended ports, on such and such lines', i.e. the lines which he had mentioned during the present discussion.

Even in making an oral statement of this kind, he would be running a certain danger. He would be exposing himself to the charge that he was keeping up the defended ports for the United Kingdom to occupy.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN agreed that it would be reasonable, assuming that Éire took over the defended ports, for the Government of Éire to determine the standard at which their defences were to be maintained. He would like it to be said, however, that the United Kingdom would be consulted in the matter and would be given the opportunity of making representations.

MR. DE VALERA was very dubious about this last suggestion. It would be calculated to retard co-operation, not to assist it. It was better to leave matters on the basis he had mentioned, viz: that it was in the interests of Éire to guard against the common peril, and that it must be assumed that she would act in accordance with those interests.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the people of the United Kingdom also had their susceptibilities. As regards the work of bringing the defended ports up to date, it seemed to him that there would have to be a short delay at first, during which Mr. de Valera's Government made their preparations. They would have to decide over what period they intended to spread the process of modernization. The financial difficulty would depend on the length of this period.

Would there not be a transitional stage, during which the Government of Éire might want to be able to count on help from this country?

MR. DE VALERA said that, so far as he was concerned, he would be quick to appeal for United Kingdom assistance if the common peril arose during the transitional stage. There would be no stage, however, in which Éire would leave the ports ungarrisoned.

As he had indicated, he was exposing himself to misrepresentation in his own country by going as far as he had done. Why, it would be said, was he concentrating on the defence of these particular localities? His answer would be that any potential enemy would places as high a value on the defended ports as did the United Kingdom. These, therefore, were the objectives for which that enemy would make.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP suggested that another argument might be to say that the Éire Government's pledge to defend their country against external aggression would have no meaning if the ports were left undefended. Those ports were natural harbours and most attractive to any aggressor.

MR. DE VALERA said that he agreed. Turning to another point, might he ask for Mr. Chamberlain's opinion whether the danger existed that war would break out suddenly during the stage before the ports could be put into order?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he could only give the answer which he was accustomed to return to similar enquiries. The most dangerous time of all was the present moment. The United Kingdom was every month becoming more formidable for an enemy to tackle. The longer one waited to make one's preparations, the greater the danger.

Éire would have to do as this country had done, namely, not to apply the whole of its financial strength to rearmament, but to arrive at a working compromise between the claims of rearmament and those of ordinary peace-time trade. They would have to strike a balance.

MR. MacENTEE imagined that there was no question of Éire's defence expenditure being concentrated in one year. It would have to be spread.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN agreed. There would, in any case, be great difficulty in obtaining the necessary supplies within any one year. Probably it would have to be a two to three year programme.

MR. DE VALERA assented. He would like to remind the Meeting of his warning that he would not be able to concentrate defence on the ports. The people of Éire would be highly suspicious if the ports were modernized in isolation. Parallel with that there would have to be a more general defence programme.

SIR THOMAS INSKIP said that Éire was not the only part of the Commonwealth where there were defended ports with a programme of modernization, an order of priority etc. For example, the Union of South Africa paid for the modernization of their ports, but concerted their programme in consultation with this country.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether Mr. de Valera expected a guarantee from this country that we would give assistance to Éire if we were called upon.

MR. DE VALERA said that this was so.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked how Mr. de Valera proposed to leave the question of technical assistance, e.g. in equipment, in training and in the establishment of munitions factories. What did the Government of Éire intend to do about purchasing those materials which they would be unable to provide themselves?

MR. DE VALERA said that he could give no answer until he had consulted his Cabinet, which had, as yet, hardly come to grips with these problems. The provision of gas masks was one of the questions which would have to be tackled. On all these matters public opinion in Éire was totally unprepared.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN feared that a rude awakening was in store for it.

MR. MACDONALD suggested that, in practice, the Government of Éire would find it best to purchase in this country what they could not make at home. They would find that there were advantages in the interchangeability of equipment.

MR. DE VALERA said that he personally agreed. In Éire's geographical situation it would be essential for her equipment to be interchangeable with that of the United Kingdom, even if Éire had no connection with the Commonwealth.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN entirely agreed. He would like to emphasize the fact that in war it was not enough to make a good start. It was vitally important to be assured that one could replace one's spare parts. He realised that all this was very delicate ground for Éire.

MR. DE VALERA agreed. It was such delicate ground that he would not have trodden upon it if he had not been absolutely convinced that he ought to do so in the interests of the people of Éire.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN thought that, at this stage of the discussion, it might be profitable to begin putting something on paper. Did Mr. de Valera agree that the material now existed for a first tentative draft?

MR. DE VALERA was much opposed to this. It would be found that the moment the two sides attempted to put decisions on paper their difficulties would revive.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN was afraid that it was nevertheless essential to do so. Failing this the Conference would have produced no concrete results.

MR. DE VALERA said that he also was concerned to obtain the best results. It was with this in view that he wished to avoid putting conclusions on paper.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN indicated that there was great difficulty in having only a 'gentleman's agreement'. All of them would be very closely questioned by the Press, who would be sure in the end to find out that a 'gentleman's agreement' existed. The moment this fact was divulged, both the Parliament in Westminster and the Parliament in Dublin would demand to see the text. The pressure would be irresistible.

MR. DE VALERA thought that it might be enough to inform the public that Articles 6 and 7 of the 1921 Treaty had been abrogated.

SIR JOHN SIMON was afraid that this abrogation was not easy ground for the United Kingdom Government to defend. Article 7 read as follows:

'The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to his Majesty's Imperial Forces:

1. In time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State; and
2. In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for the purpose of such defence as aforesaid.'

The House of Commons would be certain to ask how the United Kingdom was to know, in the absence of Article 7, that it was not being left in the lurch. How could there be any assurance that the defended ports were being kept in a proper state?

MR. DE VALERA said that the only answer would be to refer to his public statements in which a guarantee was given that Éire would not permit the defended ports to be used as bases for an attack on the United Kingdom, and would take steps to implement her undertaking.

In addition, it ought to be obvious that the interests of Éire itself would make it essential for that country to deny the defended ports to any foreign power.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN was afraid that the House of Commons would not be satisfied with oral statements. They would be certain to demand a White Paper. Was there any valid objection at the present stage of the negotiations to the two sides asking their respective officials to draw up a preliminary draft? The Conference could then examine that draft and alter it as required.

MR. DE VALERA was afraid that the respective positions of the two sides were too far apart. It was beyond the wit of man to draw up a formula which would both hand the ports over to Éire and yet lay it down that the United Kingdom had the right to use them in an emergency.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that Mr. de Valera had misunderstood. He (Mr. Chamberlain) had accepted Mr. de Valera's insistence that there could be no question of giving an assurance here and now that the ports would be made available for the use of United Kingdom forces in the event of a major war. He was not pressing Mr. de Valera further on that point.

SIR JOHN SIMON ventured to point out to Mr. de Valera that the concession which had been made to his (Mr. de Valera's) view by Mr. Chamberlain made it absolutely essential that the terms of agreement should be put on paper. It would be impossible to defend an oral agreement on such an important issue.

MR. DE VALERA did not see how the position could be put into writing without depriving the people of Éire of some of their sovereign rights.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he entirely agreed with Sir John Simon's last remark.

Mr. de Valera must not assume that United Kingdom Ministers were going to be difficult. They had entered the Conference with a sincere desire to reach agreement if it were at all possible. They would not insist upon any non-essentials. When the draft had been produced, if Mr. de Valera and his colleagues took exception to any point, United Kingdom Ministers would undertake to consider whether the words objected to were capable of modification.

MR. DE VALERA said that in view of Mr. Chamberlain's appeal the Delegation of Éire would naturally agree to a draft being prepared for examination by the Conference. He must warn them, however, that they would not find drafting easy. Both he himself and his advisers had tried in vain to draft a satisfactory formula dealing with these issues.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that the Éire authorities had not at that time known how far the United Kingdom was prepared to go in order to meet them.

MR. MACDONALD ventured to refer to the Éire Parliament's well-known dislike of unpublished agreements. It seemed to him that this was another argument which made it quite essential that there should be a published document of some kind.

MR. DE VALERA did not dispute this, provided it was possible to agree on a text. He ought to warn the Conference that if agreement were reached he would not be able to go further than putting his initials to the text, until it had been examined and approved by his Cabinet in Dublin. He proposed to be extremely cautious, particularly because he had not brought his draftsmen or legal advisers with him. It might be that the legal advisers in Dublin would point out insuperable objections to any text agreed upon at the Conference.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the United Kingdom Delegation for their part would have to submit the text for approval by their Cabinet. There was no reason, however, to suppose that the Cabinet as a whole would take a different view from that of the United Kingdom Ministers now present.

MR. DE VALERA said that on the whole he would prefer that the draft should be furnished by the United Kingdom advisers. In agreeing to consider a draft, he wished to place on record his view that defence was not an isolated problem. It was interwoven with all the other issues before the Conference.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN assented.

Sir Thomas Inskip was invited to give instructions, in the light of the preceding discussion, for the preparation of a preliminary draft, for examination by the Conference.

It was agreed to issue the following Press Communiqué:

A further meeting between representatives of the Government of Éire and representatives of the United Kingdom Government was held at No. 10, Downing Street at 12 noon to-day, with the Prime Minister in the Chair. The discussion, which was begun yesterday, was continued. The meeting adjourned at 1 o'clock and will be resumed this afternoon at 3 o'clock.

The Meeting then adjourned.