Extracts from a confidential report from Con Cremin to Seán Nunan (Dublin)
'Cease-fire in Indo-China'

The problem of a cease-fire in Indo-China was responsible for the downfall of the Laniel¹ Government and was the principal factor in the acceptance by Parliament of Mr. Mendès-France² as Prime Minister. The Parliament has of course been unanimous for some time past about the desirability of bringing the war in Indo-China to an end (see my report of 26th April):³ the divergence of opinion bore on the conditions in which, and the methods by which, this result should be achieved. You are aware of the conditions defined by the Laniel Government and that it favoured reaching a settlement by way of multilateral negotiations rather than of a bilateral arrangement with Ho Chi Minh, the leader of Vietminh.

2. Bidault⁴ naturally approached the Geneva Conference in the spirit of endeavouring to secure the maximum advantages for France in the ultimate settlement. It is generally felt, however, that at least during a certain period he overplayed his hand and refused to modify his line of conduct in the light of factors which seriously weakened his bargaining position. Two factors in particular did this. In the first place, the announcement by Sir Winston Churchill in the Commons, towards the end of April, made it perfectly clear to the world that Britain was not prepared to accept joint intervention in Indo-China pending the outcome of the Conference, it became obvious that the British attitude constituted a barrier to American intervention, and the Americans themselves, in a serious of statements over a period of weeks, recorded a progressive withdrawal from the stand announced by Dulles at the end of March that the maintenance of Indo-China was a vital American interest for which they would fight. These developments reduced almost to nil such bargaining strength as the French delegation would have derived from a potential threat of joint intervention by the West to save the position if the Communist side was not prepared to accept a settlement on terms regarded as reasonable by France. Not only the Quai d’Orsay but some sections of French public opinion were extremely annoyed by what they regarded as a more or less deliberate undermining by the British (for internal political reasons) of the French negotiating position.
3. The second major factor which weakened the French position was the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7th May. It is abundantly clear in retrospect that the French made a serious military blunder in deciding to try to hold Dien Bien Phu and were guilty of a psychological error in their propaganda build-up about the defence of the post. The fall of the garrison laid bare the military weakness of France in Indo-China and came as a most unpleasant shock to public opinion which was thus led to favour even more strongly a settlement on almost any terms. Bidault, however, was slow to take account of these changes in the position and acted rather as if France could if necessary, and should, mobilise military resources (including American) to redress the position as an alternative to accepting concessions to the other side which could be construed as equivalent to a surrender. Laniel, indeed, in his final appeal to the Assembly, before his downfall, reflected this way of thinking when he asked whether ‘there is a majority in this House for an Asiatic Munich?’, although there were suggestions that Bidault’s conduct of the negotiations was in many ways personal and paid little heed to promptings from the Cabinet. The average judgment now is that Bidault more suo was being too ‘clever’.
4. The success of Mendès-France in securing parliamentary approval for his appointment as Prime Minister is attributable primarily to his undertaking to secure a settlement in Indo-China by 20th July. He has been a well-known opponent of continuation of the war there for a long time past.

[matter omitted]

8. Opinion is divided as to whether it was a tactical weakness or otherwise for Mendès–France to fix a definite time-limit for securing a cease-fire in Indo-China. Some think that this puts him unnecessarily in the hands of the Communist side. Others hold that a time-limit can be a useful weapon when dealing with the Communists and cite in proof the fact that it was after Mr. Eden had suggested (at the middle of June) that the Conference on Indo-China be brought to an end as further discussion would be fruitless, that Chou En Lai⁵ produced the offer of evacuating Laos and Cambodia – a result which for certain commentators shows that Bidault’s line was less ineffective than his opponents claim. The Prime Minister, in a broadcast speech on 26th instant, suggested that the policy he has himself defined (i.e. cease-fire by 20th July or alternatively continuation of the war) is calculated to lead to the success of the negotiations and ‘has already had some effect’.
9. A fact which could have an important effect on the future of the negotiations is the recent replacement of Buu Loc as Prime Minister of Vietnam by Ngo Dinh Diem. The latter, who is a fervent Catholic, has the reputation of being a staunch nationalist and, while quite opposed to Communism, of having some sympathy with the aspirations of the Vietminh. It is probable that the terms on which he has accepted his appointment will involve the progressive withdrawal of the Bao Dai⁶ from the conduct of affairs. An Asiatic colleague, with whom I discussed the question, tells me however that he personally makes some reservations about Ngo Dinh Diem on the ground that he has a strong American background and might conceivably become another Syngman Rhee.⁷
10. An obvious question is whether Mendès-France and Chou En Lai discussed French recognition of the Chinese Government. Mendès-France asserted that the conversation did not extend beyond the problem of Indo-China. Some have argued that the fact of his meeting Chou En Lai, and in the French Embassy in Berne, implies a step in the direction of recognition: Bidault did see Chou En Lai on three occasions between 1st and 17th June, but in less formal circumstances. Mendès-France personally, I am sure, would see no objection to recognising Peking.