Confidential report from Frederick H. Boland to Seán Murphy (Dublin)
(Confidential)

The following account of the present position in the Middle East, including the reaction of the Arab Governments to the so-called Eisenhower doctrine,² is based on information given me confidentially by the United States and Canadian delegations. In particular, the Canadian delegation showed me copies of two secret reports recently received from their Ambassador in Cairo, Mr. Norman, giving an up-to-date appraisal of the situation. The following account is mainly based on these two reports.

From the American point of view, President Eisenhower’s statement of his new Middle-Eastern policy would have been much more effective if it had paid closer regard to the susceptibilities and present emotional reactions of the Governments in the area concerned. Most of them, and particularly Egypt, were disappointed and hurt to find in the announcement no specific condemnation of Colonialism and no reprobation of the recent Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt. The way in which the statement was drafted helped Egypt to misrepresent the new initiative to the Arab world. This the Cairo Radio is doing systematically. Its principal criticisms of the Eisenhower plan are that it simply means substituting the United States for Britain and France as the leading Imperialist Power in the Middle East; that there is no political vacuum in the Middle East; that emergent Arab nationalism is quite able to fill any vacuum left by the destruction of French and British influence; and that the plan is merely a device for deflecting the Arab world from steering a middle course between the two Power blocs which is in its own best interest. Although the Egyptian Government has made no official announcement of its attitude and is still pestering the United States State Department with requests for clarification, the foregoing may be safely taken to represent Colonel Nasser’s personal reaction to President Eisenhower’s proposal.

Lebanon is definitely favourable to President Eisenhower’s proposal. Syria is flatly opposed to it. Libya, Sudan and Saudi Arabia welcome it with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The general effect of the proposal has been to increase Egypt’s growing isolation in the Arab world. King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud,³ though outwardly very friendly to Egypt, is, in fact, highly critical and jealous of Colonel Nasser. He resents the extent to which his people listen to the views of the Egyptian Government broadcast by the Cairo Radio instead of what he has to say himself, and was also deeply offended by Colonel Nasser’s action in announcing the nationalisation of the Suez Canal without letting him know beforehand. The King, as you know, is on a visit to Washington at present. He is to be followed next month by the Prince Regent of Iraq. Colonel Nasser, upset by this evidence of rapprochement between the United States and his closest friends, recently passed on a hint to the United States Embassy in Cairo, through an Egyptian journalist who is a personal friend of his, that, if he received an invitation to visit Washington, he would not refuse it. The United States Government has so far ignored the hint.

So far as Egypt is concerned, the present policy of the United States Government is to give Colonel Nasser what a United States diplomat in Cairo described recently as ‘the Mosaddegh treatment’. As another US Embassy official put it, the American Government is prepared to let the Nasser régime ‘wither on the vine’. If Nasser wants to get back into the good graces of the American Government, he must ‘work his passage’ – in particular, by giving convincing proof of his determination to end his present associations with the Communist bloc. The US Embassy in Cairo is being careful not to encourage opposition to Colonel Nasser’s régime, but they are definitely not disposed to use him in any circumstances as the corner-stone of their policy in the Middle East. The attitude of the United States Government puts Colonel Nasser in somewhat of a dilemma. He must either throw in his lot more closely with Soviet Russia and the Communist bloc, which would mean definitely closing his account with the United States; or side unequivocally with the West and give up his present jockeying between the two blocs. Either course, it is thought, is likely to lessen Nasser’s prestige and endanger his régime.

The Nasser régime is already shaky. From the economic point of view, the internal situation is very bad. It is an open secret that Egypt has no possibility of being able to pay the amount she promised Jordan in return for giving up the British subsidy. >From the political point of view, there is no immediate crisis. The present position is one of stagnation and indecision. In recent interviews, Colonel Nasser has been obviously in a mood of vexation and frustration. Supporters of the former Parliamentary régime are now criticising Nasser openly. There is no question of the former Parliamentary régime coming back into power. The prospect of change lies between the assumption of power by a rival Army faction or the introduction of a strong dosage of new blood into the present administration.

The present mood of indecision and unrest is an aftermath of the Suez crisis. The Anglo-French-Israeli attack created a spirit of exhilaration among the people. Nasser himself remained cool and showed a fair amount of address in handling the diplomatic problems arising from the aggression. Now, public opinion in Egypt has swung to the other extreme. In spite of the official propaganda, the poor performance of the Egyptian army is generally realised and the country feels the humiliation. The population is conscious of the growing economic chaos. A French-Canadian missionary told the Canadian Embassy in Cairo that the Government is resorting to forcible collection of levies in the villages, often by very dubious means, to raise the funds required to cover day-to-day needs. The text of the decree nationalising foreign-owned Banks, insurance firms and import houses, has not yet been issued, although it was announced some weeks ago. The only information that is being published about it is that the Government has decided to substitute the word ‘Egyptianise’ for the word ‘nationalise’ in the decree. There are definite signs of dissidence in the Army, particularly in the armoured (cavalry) corps. The two Salem brothers,⁴ once very close to Nasser, are openly disaffected. General Naguib was removed from the leadership of the Government for lack of political sense and judgment. Colonel Nasser was never so affectionately regarded by the Egyptian people as General Naguib. He was considered, however, to be much more astute politically. Now that faith in Colonel Nasser’s political judgment is declining, he may find himself going the way of General Naguib – with this distinction, that, in Colonel Nasser’s case, the general view is that he is not so likely to ‘go quietly’.

The growing lack of faith in Colonel Nasser’s policies is also evident in the external sphere. Libya is disassociating herself from Egypt. About fourteen days ago, she signed a pact with Tunisia which the subsequent communiqué said was intended to be the ‘corner-stone of North African unity’. If Morocco becomes a party to this pact, as she is expected to do, it will be the most serious reverse which Colonel Nasser has suffered because the Sultan of Morocco is known to be personally hostile to Nasser and very critical of his policies.

Further evidence of the decline of Egyptian prestige among her neighbours is seen in the fact that the Egyptian Military Attachés were recently expelled from Libya, Lebanon and Ethiopia – presumably for trying to incite support for Egypt’s policies among the Army officers in those countries. Sudan has also recently shown signs of nervousness, particularly about Egypt’s association with the Communist bloc. Sudan is sitting on the fence so far as the Eisenhower plan is concerned. The Sudanese Ambassador in Cairo recently told Mr. Wadsworth, the US Ambassador there, that, if the majority of the Arab States favoured the plan, Sudan would fully support it too.

The estimate of the American and Canadian missions in Cairo is that there will be a comfortable majority of the States in the Middle East which, in varying degrees, will favour the Eisenhower plan, especially in its economic aspects. Even Jordan is thought to be wavering. Much will depend on the results of the conversations with the King of Saudi Arabia here in Washington. He is known to be opposed to any United States attempt to use the plan as a means of disrupting the unity of the Arab world; he thinks that Egypt is wrong in trying to swing Arab opinion against the plan, as it is doing, and is thought to have warned Colonel Nasser that, if, as is probable, the plan goes through in spite of his opposition, it will further weaken Egypt’s position in the Arab League and Colonel Nasser’s own position in Egypt.

There has been a definite increase in underground Communist activity in Egypt. The Communist party is illegal under Egyptian law, but, in the mood engendered by the attack on Egypt, this seemed to have been forgotten and the authorities seem to have allowed widespread circulation of Communist propaganda pamphlets. This activity is still going on and is now starting to give serious concern to the Egyptian authorities. For example, the Egyptian Government is making vigorous efforts to collect the small arms which it distributed widespread to the population at the time of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack. The authorities may fear that if the régime is challenged and civil disorder results, the presence of such large quantities of arms in the hands of the people may have serious consequences. Communist pamphlets, which are being circulated widely, are, however, urging the people to hold on to these arms at all costs because ‘the battle against Imperialism has not yet been won’. The fact that the Communists are taking this line, in direct opposition to Egyptian Government policy, is taken as a possible sign that Soviet Russia has now come to regard Colonel Nasser as ‘expendable’, and hopes that civil disorder or civil war in Egypt may redound to its own advantage.

I am told that it is against the background of which I have just given an account that the United States is shaping its attitude in the further debate on the Egyptian situation which is now proceeding in the Assembly.